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INTRODUCTION
The worldwide impact of the subprime crisis has revealed fundamental
weaknesses in the system of international financial regulation (IFR) that has
emerged since the 1970s. At the same time, diagnosing and repairing these
weaknesses has proven difficult because the system and its functions are poorly
understood. In sharp contrast with other international regimes like trade or
environmental law, IFR relies not on treaties and formal international organizations
but on “soft law” standards designed by informal networks of national regulators—
so-called “transnational regulatory networks” (TRNs). The development of these
standards is highly uneven; detailed rules like the Basel accords on bank capital
adequacy long cohabited with negligible progress in areas like insurance, hedge
funds, and credit rating agencies. Scholars, for their part, differ sharply in their
assessments of IFR. The conventional wisdom is that the current, informal system
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of IFR allows regulators to respond effectively and flexibly to new market and
technological challenges.1 In light of the financial crisis, however, skepticism is
growing.2 Some prominent legal and economic commentators have even called for
a World Financial Authority—a formal, treaty-based organization to regulate
international finance.3
An elementary difficulty in this debate is the lack of a convincing account of the
objectives pursued by IFR. In other areas, relatively uncontroversial theories
explain why unilateral action by states is suboptimal and international cooperation
can produce collective gains. For instance, the logic of the international trade
system rests on the premise that individual states often have economic and political
incentives to impose trade barriers, even though protectionism ultimately decreases
the welfare of all.4 Likewise, because some costs of pollution are externalized
across borders, individual states may have incentives to adopt excessively lenient

1. See, e.g., CHRIS BRUMMER, SOFT LAW AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM: RULE
MAKING IN THE 21ST CENTURY 63–67 (2012); ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD
ORDER 36–61 (2004); Chris Brummer, How International Financial Law Works (And How It
Doesn’t), 99 GEO. L.J. 257 (2011) [hereinafter Brummer, How International Financial Law
Works]; Chris Brummer, Why Soft Law Dominates International Finance—And Not Trade,
13 J. INT’L ECON. L. 623 (2010); Sungjoon Cho & Claire R. Kelly, Promises and Perils of
New Global Governance: A Case of the G20, 12 CHI. J. INT’L L. 491 (2012); Roberta S.
Karmel & Claire R. Kelly, The Hardening of Soft Law in Securities Regulation, 34 BROOK. J.
INT’L L. 883 (2009); Yesha Yadav, The Specter of Sisyphus: Re-making International
Financial Regulation After the Global Financial Crisis, 24 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 83 (2010).
2. See DANIEL K. TARULLO, BANKING ON BASEL: THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL
FINANCIAL REGULATION (2008); Douglas W. Arner & Michael W. Taylor, The Global
Financial Crisis and the Financial Stability Board: Hardening the Soft Law of International
Financial Regulation?, 32 U. NEW S. WALES L.J. 488 (2009); Edward F. Greene & Joshua L.
Boehm, The Limits of “Name-and-Shame” in International Financial Regulation, 97
CORNELL L. REV. 1083 (2012); Eric J. Pan, Challenge of International Cooperation and
Institutional Design in Financial Supervision: Beyond Transgovernmental Networks, 11 CHI.
J. INT’L L. 243 (2010); Pierre-Hugues Verdier, Transnational Regulatory Networks and
Their Limits, 34 YALE J. INT’L L. 113 (2009); David Zaring, International Institutional
Performance in Crisis, 10 CHI. J. INT’L L. 475 (2010); Kenneth Anderson, Squaring the
Circle? Reconciling Sovereignty and Global Governance Through Global Government
Networks, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1255 (2005) (reviewing ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW
WORLD ORDER (2004)).
3. See, e.g., Peter Boone & Simon Johnson, Will the Politics of Global Moral Hazard
Sink Us Again?, in THE FUTURE OF FINANCE AND THE THEORY THAT UNDERPINS IT 247, 269
(2010); John Eatwell & Lance Taylor, A World Financial Authority, in INTERNATIONAL
CAPITAL MARKETS: SYSTEMS IN TRANSITION 17 (John Eatwell & Lance Taylor eds., 2002);
Pan, supra note 2, at 249–52; Carmen Reinhart & Kenneth Rogoff, Regulation Should Be
International, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2008; Barry J. Eichengreen, Out of the Box Thoughts
About the International Financial Architecture 18–20 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper
No. 116, 2009); David Wright, Remarks at the Atlantic Council (Dec. 10, 2012).
4. See, e.g., KYLE BAGWELL & ROBERT W. STAIGER, THE ECONOMICS OF THE WORLD
TRADING SYSTEM 13–41 (2002); MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK & ROBERT HOWSE, THE
REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 6–8 (3d ed. 2005); Robert W. Staiger & Alan O.
Sykes, International Trade, National Treatment, and Domestic Regulation, 40 J. LEG. STUD.
149, 166–68 (2011).
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environmental rules.5 In both situations, states can improve collective outcomes by
adopting common standards. These simple theories provide both a rationale for the
existence of the trade and environment regimes and a starting point for analysis of
their rules and features. By contrast, no such standard account of IFR has emerged.
While there is a widely shared sense that national regulation alone cannot address
the challenges of financial globalization, a more detailed account is needed to
understand these challenges and assess the effectiveness of the current system.
This Article takes the first step in remedying this difficulty. It identifies five
distinct objectives that cannot be achieved by states acting unilaterally, and that
IFR has historically pursued. The IFR system has been largely successful at two of
them: facilitating cross-border supervision and enforcement assistance among
regulators, and removing barriers to international finance by harmonizing some
regulatory requirements. Most of the success stories often described in IFR
scholarship, such as the International Organization of Securities Commissions’
(IOSCO) Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding (MMOU), the Basel
Concordat on bank supervision, and international accounting standards, relate to
these objectives. There are, however, three other objectives in respect of which the
IFR system has performed poorly. First, it has encountered numerous setbacks in
its attempts to raise regulatory standards in states where there is substantial
domestic political resistance, such as offshore financial centers (OFCs) and
developing Asian states after the late 1990s crisis. Second, it has struggled to
secure durable collective action to raise prudential standards, such as capital
adequacy rules. The 1988 Basel Accord was a major exception, but as will be seen,
it stood virtually alone and was substantially weakened over time. Finally, the IFR
system has generally failed to create credible collective mechanisms to address
situations where unilateral action is counterproductive. For instance, there is no
effective mechanism for cross-border bank resolution; often, each state simply
grabs the assets it can to satisfy its own creditors.
This assessment relates directly to the debate on the institutional structure of
IFR. If TRNs and “soft law” only achieve such limited success, why do they
continue to dominate IFR? The conventional account draws on rational choice
theories, under which states design international institutions by carefully balancing
the costs and benefits and choosing the most efficient solution. In this view, TRNs
and soft law dominate IFR because they provide some incentives for compliance
while preserving the benefits of speed, flexibility, and expertise.6 This Article
proposes an alternative explanation that casts doubt on the purported efficiency of
current arrangements. The explanation is two-pronged. First, it draws on historical
path dependence, the idea that past institutional choices shape current options in
ways that can prevent the adoption of more efficient alternatives. The current IFR
system has been profoundly shaped by history. As will be seen, under the postwar
Bretton Woods monetary system, international capital mobility was expected to be
strictly limited. Therefore, there was no need for a formal institution to regulate

5. See, e.g., Scott Barrett, An Economic Theory of International Environmental Law, in
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 231 (Daniel Bodansky,
Jutta Brunnée & Ellen Hey eds., 2007).
6. See, e.g., Brummer, How International Financial Law Works, supra note 1.

1408

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 88:1405

private international finance, alongside the ones established for monetary affairs
and trade.7 When the fixed rate system collapsed in the 1970s, national regulators
faced numerous new cross-border challenges. With no international framework to
address them and no authority to create formal institutions or binding agreements,
they instead created informal networks and non-binding standards. For better or
worse, this approach remains the cornerstone of the current system.8
Second, the explanation draws on political economy by identifying three
categories of actors that play a central role in shaping IFR: national regulators, the
financial industry, and great power governments.9 While these actors sometimes
have incentives to pursue effective IFR, they also have competing interests that can
drive a wedge between the potential gains from international cooperation and actual
outcomes. Thus, national regulators value some international cooperation, but also
want to preserve their extensive domestic authority and resist binding rules and
international oversight. The financial industry is willing to support some regulatory
harmonization to facilitate cross-border activity, but resists costly prudential
regulations. For their part, the great powers typically prefer fragmented and
informal international governance over strong collective institutions where they can
less easily wield their influence. Indeed, with respect to each of the five objectives
identified above, this article shows that IFR initiatives usually succeeded when they
had strong support from at least one of these actors and passive acquiescence by the
others. While there are exceptions, such as the imposition of higher prudential
standards after crises, such initiatives succeed only in very specific circumstances
and tend to peter out over time.10 As a result, most of IFR is simply the lowest
common denominator of what these actors are willing to do (or tolerate).
In contrast with conventional theories of IFR, this account grounded in historical
path dependence and political economy explains several features of the current
system: the substantial differences in outcomes across areas of IFR, including the
virtual absence of effective standards in some of the most difficult areas; the overall
preference for soft law and TRNs over formal law and institutions; and the high
degree of inertia that leads to slow, incremental revision of existing standards and
institutional arrangements rather than fundamental reforms—even in the wake of
major crises.
While the analysis above is based on the historical development of IFR before
the recent financial crisis, it illuminates the trajectory of the reforms initiated since
then. The most difficult challenges revealed by the crisis—tackling systemic risk
and moral hazard—fall precisely in the areas where IFR has performed poorly in
the past. In response, governments and regulators have launched a major effort to
reorganize the architecture of IFR by giving a leading role to the G-20 and the
Financial Stability Board (FSB) in developing and implementing an array of
substantive reforms in numerous areas of financial regulation.11 Nevertheless, a
review of three salient items on the post-crisis agenda—Basel III, cross-border
resolution of financial institutions, and monitoring and enforcement of standards—

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

See infra Part I.A.
See infra Parts I.B., I.C.
See infra Part II.C.
See infra Part III.B.
See infra Part IV.A.
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reveals that, despite ambitious goals, achievements have so far been uneven and
many precrisis patterns persist.12 The postcrisis era in IFR is characterized by
tension between stronger demand for effective reforms and the historical and
political constraints described above. While these constraints make radical changes
unlikely, the coming years may see a gradual move away from soft law and TRNs
towards more binding rules and international oversight, especially in areas where
the current IFR system has shown its limitations. The Article concludes by
providing some recommendations for enhancing the effectiveness of IFR within
current constraints.13
The rest of the Article proceeds as follows. Part I explains the historical origins
of IFR, laying the ground for subsequent analysis of its politics and achievements.
Part II reviews conventional accounts of IFR, then proposes an alternative account
that draws on historical path dependence and political economy. It identifies three
categories of actors—regulators, financial firms, and great powers—that most
influence outcomes, and proposes hypotheses regarding their respective interests
and how they interact. Part III deploys this political economy analysis to explain
variations in outcomes across five salient areas of IFR, and the overall dominance
of soft law and TRNs despite their limited effectiveness. Finally, Part IV assesses
the impact of the financial crisis on IFR, some of the reforms led by the G-20, and
potential improvements.
I. THE ORIGINS OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL REGULATION
A. The Bretton Woods System
To understand the origins of the current, decentralized system of IFR, one must
go back to the post-World War II settlement that created the modern international
economic order. As early as 1941, the Allies expressed in the Atlantic Charter their
desire to “bring about the fullest collaboration between all nations in the economic
field with the object of securing, for all, improved labor standards, economic
advancement and social security.”14 The new system would be a multilateral
alternative to the chaotic economic competition of the 1930s—what U.S. Treasury
Secretary Morgenthau called the “desperate tactics of the past—competitive
currency depreciation, excessive tariff barriers, uneconomic barter deals, multiple
currency practices and unnecessary exchange restrictions.”15 These practices, the
postwar planners believed, had deepened the Great Depression and ultimately

12. See infra Part IV.B.
13. See infra Part IV.C.
14. Atlantic Charter, U.S.-U.K., Aug. 14, 1941, 55 Stat. 1603, available at http://avalon.
law.yale.edu/wwii/atlantic.asp.
15. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, PUB. NO. 2866, PROCEEDINGS AND DOCUMENTS OF THE UNITED
NATIONS MONETARY AND FINANCIAL CONFERENCE 1226 (1948) [hereinafter BRETTON
WOODS PROCEEDINGS]; see also RICHARD N. GARDNER, STERLING-DOLLAR DIPLOMACY:
ANGLO-AMERICAN COLLABORATION IN THE RECONSTRUCTION OF MULTILATERAL TRADE 76
(1956).
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contributed to the war.16 In their place, they sought “to recreate a liberal world
economy in which stable exchange rates and free trade were the norm.”17
The cornerstone of the postwar economic order would be a new international
monetary system to replace the gold standard that had disintegrated in the 1930s.18
A stable monetary system would, in turn, provide the foundation for reviving
international trade by abolishing discriminatory preferences and reducing tariffs
and other barriers to trade. In both areas—monetary affairs and trade—the postwar
planners envisioned a highly legalized regime based on formal treaty obligations
and intergovernmental organizations. In crafting the treaties, they strived to balance
multilateral obligations with domestic economic and social policy autonomy.19 The
most ambitious manifestation of this vision was the IMF Articles of Agreement,
which established an elaborate code of conduct for international monetary
relations.20
The Articles created a system of fixed exchange rates, under which all
currencies were pegged to the U.S. dollar, and the dollar itself pegged to gold at a
rate of $35 per ounce. IMF member states agreed to several fundamental
obligations. First, they would adopt and maintain a fixed “par value” for their
currency, expressed in gold or dollars, and not change it unless necessary to correct
a “fundamental disequilibrium.”21 In order to fulfill this obligation, they would
intervene in the foreign exchange market by buying or selling their own currency
near par value.22 Second, they would allow private persons to freely exchange their
currency for current account transactions, such as international sales of goods and
services.23 This obligation amounted to maintaining the convertibility of their
currency, at least for current transactions, and was seen as essential to reviving
international trade.24 Finally, under this system, a country that ran a current account
deficit would eventually run out of foreign currency reserves needed to maintain its

16. See GARDNER, supra note 15; ROBERT SKIDELSKY, JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES 1883–
1946, at 669 (2003).
17. SKIDELSKY, supra note 16, at 698.
18. See ERIC HELLEINER, STATES AND THE REEMERGENCE OF GLOBAL FINANCE: FROM
BRETTON WOODS TO THE 1990S 25–50 (1994).
19. See John Gerard Ruggie, International Regimes, Transactions, and Change:
Embedded Liberalism in Postwar Economic Order, 36 INT’L ORG. 379, 394 (1982).
20. For an overview, see ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW
605–17 (2d ed. 2008).
21. INT’L MONETARY FUND & INT’L BANK OF RECONSTRUCTION & DEV., U.S. TREASURY,
ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT art. IV(1), (5) (1944) [hereinafter ORIGINAL IMF ARTICLES]. The
term was undefined, but was “understood, it seems, to mean a situation not correctable
within the time for which resources of the Fund would be made available to members under
drawings.” LOWENFELD, supra note 20, at 623.
22. See ORIGINAL IMF ARTICLES, supra note 21, at art. IV(4)(b).
23. See id. art. VIII(2)(a); see also id. art. VIII(3) (prohibiting discriminatory
arrangements or multiple currency practices).
24. However, members were entitled to maintain currency restrictions during an
undefined “post-war transitional period.” Most industrialized countries had moved to
“Article VIII status” by the early 1960s. See LOWENFELD, supra note 20, at 607–08; Beth A.
Simmons, Money and the Law: Why Comply with the Public International Law of Money, 25
YALE J. INT’L L. 323, 338 (2000).
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currency at par value. To address this problem, all members would contribute to a
fund administered by the IMF and available for lending to deficit countries, on the
condition that they take steps to restore the balance of payment equilibrium.25
The crucial point is that while they prohibited restrictions on current
transactions, the IMF Articles of Agreement did not prohibit—and indeed
encouraged—capital controls.26 The two architects of the Bretton Woods monetary
system, Harry Dexter White and John Maynard Keynes, concluded from the
interwar experience that unrestricted capital flows were destabilizing.27 They were
eager to preserve the economic and social policy autonomy of states, which they
thought would be compromised by uncontrolled movements of capital.28 They also
believed that unimpeded capital flows would undermine the fixed exchange rate
system and free trade.29 Since shifts in investor sentiment could change the size and
direction of capital flows much more rapidly than trade, the IMF’s resources would
be insufficient to sustain national reserves while policy adjustments took place.30
White and Keynes’ solution was to draw a line between capital and current
transactions, permitting restrictions on the former but not the latter.31 Indeed,
Keynes wrote that “control of capital movements, both inward and outward, should
be a permanent feature of the post-war system.”32 Some countries, such as the
United States, refrained from imposing such controls, but most did impose them.33
Thus, the Bretton Woods system “strongly encouraged closed national financial
markets, with limited capital flows, and open markets for trade in goods.”34 To the
extent that international capital flows were needed for reconstruction and

25. ORIGINAL IMF ARTICLES, supra note 21, at arts. III, VI. Each member state was
assigned a quota, based roughly on its importance in the world economy, which it had to
contribute to the Fund (25% in gold and the rest in its own currency). While in theory all
currencies could be used for lending, in practice only those currencies generally accepted in
international transactions—such as the U.S. dollar—were useful. See LOWENFELD, supra
note 20, at 610.
26. ORIGINAL IMF ARTICLES, supra note 21, at art. VI(3) (“Members may exercise such
controls as are necessary to regulate international capital movements.”). Generally, capital
controls are restrictions on cross-border flows of capital, such as loans and transactions in
financial assets like stocks and bonds. They can take many forms, including taxes and
government or central bank approval requirements. For the argument that capital controls
were in fact encouraged under Bretton Woods, see HELLEINER, supra note 18, at 25–50.
27. See SKIDELSKY, supra note 16, at 676, 698.
28. See HELLEINER, supra note 18, at 33–35; Ruggie, supra note 19, at 290.
29. See HELLEINER, supra note 18, at 35–36.
30. In any event, the United States, which contributed most of the IMF’s initial funding,
was unwilling to permit it to fund capital flight. Thus, the Articles prohibited member states
from drawing on the Fund to meet a “large or sustained outflow of capital.” ORIGINAL IMF
ARTICLES, supra note 21, at art. VI(1)(a).
31. See KENNETH W. DAM, THE RULES OF THE GAME: REFORM AND EVOLUTION IN THE
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM 99–100 (1982).
32. HELLEINER, supra note 18, at 33 (quoting 3 J. KEITH HORSEFIELD, THE
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, 1945-1965, at 13 (1969)).
33. Id. at 51–77.
34. Douglas W. Arner & Ross P. Buckley, Redesigning the Architecture of the Global
Financial System, 11 MELB. J. INT’L. L. 185, 188 (2010) (citation omitted).
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development, the postwar planners contemplated that they would occur primarily
through official channels, not private investment.35 Thus, the U.S. government
directly financed the reconstruction of Europe through the Marshall Plan.36 For its
part, the World Bank initially was to play a major role in postwar reconstruction,
but instead became a source of official funding for development projects.37 In
addition, many of the leading Treasury officials involved in postwar financial
planning were New Dealers suspicious of private international banking and its role
in the interwar years.38 Secretary Morgenthau famously rejoiced that Bretton
Woods would “drive . . . the usurious money lenders from the temple of
international finance.”39 Given the limited role contemplated for private
international finance in the postwar order, it is unsurprising that its architects did
not consider its regulation worthy of a legal framework comparable to those they
designed for monetary affairs and trade. Indeed, the existing organization, the Bank
for International Settlements, was a legacy of the failed interwar economic order;
some accused it of collaborating with the Nazis.40 The Bretton Woods delegates
called for its abolition “at the earliest possible date.”41
Although the postwar planners succeeded in creating a new monetary system,
the negotiations on trade soon foundered. The General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, negotiated by twenty-three countries as a temporary code of conduct without
any institutional framework, entered into force on a provisional basis in 1948.42
While representatives of fifty-three countries agreed to the much more ambitious
Charter of the International Trade Organization later that year, by that time the
momentum for multilateralism had passed. The ITO Charter never entered into
force, and the GATT remained the central legal instrument of the multilateral trade
regime.43 Thus, while international monetary affairs were governed by an extensive

35. See Maurice Obstfeld & Alan M. Taylor, Globalization and Capital Markets, in
GLOBALIZATION IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 121, 132 (Michael D. Bordo et al. eds., 2003).
36. See JEFFRY A. FRIEDEN, BANKING ON THE WORLD: THE POLITICS OF AMERICAN
INTERNATIONAL FINANCE 68–71 (1987); GARDNER, supra note 15, at 299–304.
37. See LOWENFELD, supra note 20, at 750.
38. See FRIEDEN, supra note 36, at 60; GARDNER, supra note 15, at 76; HELLEINER,
supra note 18, at 31–32.
39. BRETTON WOODS PROCEEDINGS, supra note 15, at 1227. The New Dealers also
insisted that the World Bank and IMF be headquartered in Washington rather than New
York to “keep them free from the taint of ‘international finance.’” SKIDELSKY, supra note 16,
at 828. New York financial circles, as well as conservatives in the United States, strongly
opposed the plan. See HELLEINER, supra note 18, at 39–44; SKIDELSKY, supra note 16, at
704–05; Richard N. Gardner, The Bretton Woods-GATT System After Sixty-Five Years: A
Balance Sheet of Success and Failure, 47 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 31, 35–36 (2008);
Ruggie, supra note 19, at 393.
40. See SKIDELSKY, supra note 16, at 766; ARMAND VAN DORMAEL, BRETTON WOODS:
BIRTH OF A MONETARY SYSTEM 204 (1978).
41. See VAN DORMAEL, supra note 40, at 203–06. Keynes, interestingly, fought White
on this point. See id. at 204–05; SKIDELSKY, supra note 16, at 766. Ultimately, the BIS
survived the postwar settlement and became an important focal point for central bank
coordination. See LOWENFELD, supra note 20, at 754.
42. See LOWENFELD, supra note 20, at 27.
43. See id. at 28.
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legal framework overseen by the IMF, trade was initially the less legalized area of
international economic law. This situation changed radically in the following
decades. The monetary system collapsed, while the trade system became ever more
legalized, culminating with the creation of the WTO.
B. The Rise of International Finance
From the beginning, the Bretton Woods monetary system faced significant
difficulties. First, the distinction between capital and current transactions was
difficult to implement and led to significant “leakage” that compromised the
effectiveness of capital controls.44 Second, an extensive market developed for
deposits and loans of U.S. dollars held outside the United States, so-called
“Eurodollars.” The Eurodollar market increasingly circumvented attempts to
control capital movements, as well as U.S. domestic regulation, such as reserve
requirements.45 Nevertheless, U.K. and U.S. authorities supported its
development—the former to restore London’s importance as an international
financial center, the latter to allow U.S. bankers to retain their business despite U.S.
measures aimed at discouraging capital outflows.46 Despite these developments, the
fixed exchange rate system functioned more or less as planned until the late
1960s.47 Ultimately, it was destroyed by a third problem, the persistent U.S. current
account deficits that led to massive accumulation of U.S. dollars abroad. These

44. In this context, “leakage” refers to the occurrence of cross-border capital flows
despite the existence of capital controls, often by disguising these flows as current
transactions. For example, multinational companies could effectively transfer capital from
one country to another by manipulating the prices at which they transferred goods or services
between subsidiaries. The leakage problem was aggravated by the fact that, contrary to
White’s original draft of the relevant provision, the IMF Articles of Agreement did not
provide for true cooperative enforcement of capital controls by member states, but only for
“passive” non-enforceability in each member state of agreements contrary to the capital
controls of another. See HELLEINER, supra note 18, at 44–48.
45. See DAM, supra note 31, at 322; FRIEDEN, supra note 36, at 79–122. Ultimately, the
Eurodollar market compromised the objectives pursued by the Bretton Woods system, since
it created a new source of capital flows that were not covered by traditional capital controls.
These flows increased pressures on exchange rates and currency reserves, reducing the
ability of countries to insulate their social and economic policies. See E. WAYNE
CLENDENNING, THE EURO-DOLLAR MARKET 162–68 (1970).
46. U.S. banks could accomplish this by conducting Eurodollar operations in their
London branches. U.S. dollar deposits held abroad were not subject to reserve requirements
and other U.S. regulations. The interest equalization tax and other U.S. quasi-capital controls
of the 1960s also generally did not apply to lending by U.S. institutions in London. See
BENJAMIN J. COHEN, IN WHOSE INTEREST?: INTERNATIONAL BANKING AND AMERICAN
FOREIGN POLICY (1986); HELLEINER, supra note 18, at 88.
47. There are other qualifications. The par value system was not universally observed:
France changed its peg without authorization in 1948, and Canada floated its currency in the
1950s. See LOWENFELD, supra note 20, at 624. Many countries maintained current account
restrictions for extended periods, relying on Art. XIV. See Simmons, supra note 24, at 346–
47. Nevertheless, most observers believe that from the mid-1950s to the late 1960s, the
system functioned roughly as envisioned.
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dollar holdings eventually exceeded U.S. gold reserves, triggering a crisis of
confidence. Foreign central banks requested redemption of their dollar holdings,
and U.S. gold reserves plummeted. In 1971, President Nixon abolished the gold
convertibility of U.S. dollars.48 By 1973, all the major industrialized countries
abandoned the fixed rate system, and several attempts to reestablish it failed.49 IMF
member states can now choose their exchange rate regime and are free to change at
any time.50 Floating rates also alleviated the need for capital controls to protect
foreign exchange reserves.51 Over the 1970s and 1980s, virtually all industrialized
countries abolished them, and later encouraged others to follow suit.52
The collapse of the fixed rate system was a watershed for financial
globalization. From then on, a clear, long-term trend of increasing international
capital flows took hold. The move to floating rates created an enormous foreign
exchange market, from a negligible amount in the late 1950s53 to a daily turnover
of about $4 trillion in 201054—only a small fraction of which is for trade.55 Greater
foreign exchange and interest rate volatility drove the development of global
derivatives markets. Foreign exchange and interest rate derivatives still dominate
these markets, with $523 trillion out of the $601 trillion notional amount
outstanding in 2010—up from $68 trillion in 1998, the first year for which Bank for
International Settlements (BIS) statistics are available.56 The Eurodollar market
also grew exponentially in the 1970s, buoyed by large deposits of dollars from oil
exporters (often lent on to Latin America).57 The international activities of banks
increased rapidly: in 1960, less than ten U.S. banks had branches overseas, with
assets of less than $4 billion; in 1977, more than 100 did, with assets of $230
billion.58 The external assets of banks from the forty-one BIS-reporting countries

48. President Richard Nixon, Address to the Nation Outlining a New Economic Policy:
“The Challenge of Peace” (Aug. 15, 1971).
49. See LOWENFELD, supra note 20, at 624–33.
50. The Articles of Agreement were amended in 1978 to reflect this new regime. Most
industrialized countries float their currency. Several countries peg their currency to another
like the U.S. dollar or the euro; others have created regional monetary unions or currency
boards. The only prohibited option is a peg to gold. ORIGINAL IMF ARTICLES, supra note 21,
at art. IV(2)(b).
51. See Obstfeld & Taylor, supra note 35, at 125–26, 133.
52. See HELLEINER, supra note 18, at 9.
53. See id. at 1.
54. MONETARY & ECON. DEP’T, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, TRIENNIAL CENTRAL
BANK SURVEY, REPORT ON GLOBAL FOREIGN EXCHANGE MARKET ACTIVITY IN 2010, at 6
(2010) [hereinafter BIS 2010 FOREIGN EXCHANGE REPORT], available at www.bis.org/
publ/rpfxf10t.pdf.
55. See Gardner, supra note 39, at 43–44; HELLEINER, supra note 18, at 1.
56. See MONETARY & ECON. DEP’T, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, OTC DERIVATIVES
MARKET ACTIVITY IN THE SECOND HALF OF 2010, at 8 (2011), available at http://
www.bis.org/publ/otc_hy1105.pdf; BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, THE GLOBAL OTC
DERIVATIVES MARKET CONTINUES TO GROW 3 (2000), available at http://www.bis.org/
publ/otc_hy0011.pdf.
57. See FRIEDEN, supra note 36, at 88.
58. JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRAHOS, GLOBAL BUSINESS REGULATION 102 (2000).
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further grew from $687 billion in 1977 to $30.1 trillion in 2010.59 More recently,
debt and equity markets have also become global. International debt securities
outstanding went from $896 billion in March 1987 to $27.7 trillion in 2010;60
international equity issues for BIS-reporting countries went from $1.7 billion in
1983 to $708 billion in 2010.61 Overall, the size of financial markets relative to the
world economy has increased steadily.62 In 2007, global financial assets amounted
to 343% of the world’s GDP.63
Scholars have proposed several explanations for the globalization of finance.
Traditional accounts emphasize the importance of technological changes and
market developments: greater demand arising from the growth in international trade
and corporate activity; the need for diversification arising from greater foreign
exchange volatility; the need to reinvest the accumulation of petrodollars in the
1970s; the demise of domestically-focused postwar cartels; and financial
innovation.64 More recent accounts emphasize the role of policy decisions by states
to encourage the growth of the Eurodollar market, to refrain from imposing more
effective capital controls, and to act collectively to prevent and manage currency
crises.65 While the causes of financial globalization remain a matter of debate, it is
clear that multiple factors were at work, rather than a conscious policy decision by
states to reverse Bretton Woods and create globalized financial markets. As U.S.
Treasury Secretary Henry Fowler put it, “‘the Free World has backed inadvertently
into a developing international capital market rather than effected a rational and
conscious entry.’”66
What is the significance of this historical background? In short, the postwar
settlement created a highly institutionalized and rule-based system to govern

59. See BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, BIS QUARTERLY REVIEW A7 (June 2011),
available at http://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qa1106.pdf. The first year for which the BIS
time series is available is 1977; historical statistics are available by searching the interactive
tool at http://www.bis.org/statistics/bankstats.htm.
60. See id. at A113.
61. See id. at A128.
62. See René M. Stulz, The Limits of Financial Globalization, 60 J. FIN. 1595, 1599–
1601 (2005). This is not to say that international markets are fully globalized. Indeed,
quantitative studies show that investors in various countries overweight domestic securities
in their portfolios—the so-called “home bias” effect. See id. at 1601. For a discussion of
various measures of financial globalization, see HAL S. SCOTT, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE 17–
20 (17th ed. 2010).
63. MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST., GLOBAL CAPITAL MARKETS: ENTERING A NEW ERA 8–9
(2009), available at http://www/mckinsey.com/insights/mgi/research/financial_markets/
global_capital_markets_entering_a_new_era.
64. See HELLEINER, supra note 18, at 6–7; TONY PORTER, GLOBALIZATION AND FINANCE
12–30 (2005).
65. See FRIEDEN, supra note 36, at 112–22; HELLEINER, supra note 18, at 8–12. Some of
these accounts also emphasize the rise of neoliberal ideas. See, e.g., RAWI ABDELAL,
CAPITAL RULES: THE CONSTRUCTION OF GLOBAL FINANCE (2007); JEFFREY M. CHWIEROTH,
CAPITAL IDEAS: THE IMF AND THE RISE OF FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION (2010); HELLEINER,
supra note 18.
66. HELLEINER, supra note 18, at 89 (quoting ERIC ROLL, INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL
MOVEMENTS: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 61 (1971)).
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international economic relations. This system was the outcome of ambitious
negotiations made possible by the unique circumstances of World War II and the
immediate postwar years.67 Because it contemplated very limited international
capital mobility, mostly through official channels, no provision was made for
regulating private finance. National securities and banking regulators, such as the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC), did not take any significant part in the negotiations or the
resulting regime. As a result of the collapse of Bretton Woods and a series of other
technological, market, and political developments, international financial markets
subsequently developed to a degree unimaginable at that time. Without a formal
international framework, national regulators faced the difficult task of addressing
the new challenges posed by globalized markets with the limited tools at their
disposal. The constraints under which they labored are the key to understanding
today’s decentralized, network-based system of IFR.
C. International Regulatory Cooperation
The collapse of Bretton Woods and the dramatic increase in international capital
flows immediately caused problems for economic policymakers. In the 1960s and
early 1970s, the ministers of finance and central bank governors of the “Group of
10” met on a regular basis to coordinate exchange rate management and consider
adjustments to the Bretton Woods system.68 At the same time, banking and
securities regulators faced their own set of challenges. The world of self-contained
domestic financial systems to which they were accustomed was rapidly changing.
While banks had been expanding internationally since the 1950s, the trend
accelerated, making it ever more difficult for national authorities to regulate and
supervise their worldwide activities.69 Banks also found a major new source of
revenue—and risk—in the massive new foreign exchange markets.70 In 1974, the
collapse of several banks—notably Bankhaus Herstatt in Germany and Franklin
National Bank in the United States—disrupted interbank lending and drew
attention to the cross-border impact of bank failures and the lack of regulatory
coordination.71 The oil crisis was also straining financial markets and causing
worries about the international banking system.

67. The most notable of such circumstances include: the (temporary) unity of purpose
among the Allies; the economic dominance of the United States; the United States’
willingness to fund the system and uphold its rules; and the intellectual dominance of
Keynes and the New Dealers. See GARDNER, supra note 15; Eric Helleiner, A Bretton Woods
Moment?: The 2007–2008 Crisis and the Future of Global Finance, 86 INT’L AFF. 619
(2010).
68. See BARRY EICHENGREEN, GLOBALIZING CAPITAL: A HISTORY OF THE
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM 134–42 (2d ed. 2008). As coordination became more
complex and political, leadership on these macroeconomic issues migrated to the G-7. See
id. at 142–49.
69. See FRIEDEN, supra note 36, at 76–77, 112–16.
70. See ETHAN B. KAPSTEIN, GOVERNING THE GLOBAL ECONOMY: INTERNATIONAL
FINANCE AND THE STATE 37–39 (1994).
71. See id. at 39–42; DAVID ANDREW SINGER, REGULATING CAPITAL: SETTING
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In response, the governors of the G-10 central banks formed the Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision.72 As was the case for macroeconomic
coordination, the prevailing ethos of IFR was informality. The committee would be
a forum for regulators “not . . . to make far-fetched attempts to harmonise the
twelve countries’ individual systems of supervision, but . . . to learn from each
other and to apply the knowledge so acquired to improving their own systems of
supervision, so indirectly enhancing the likelihood of overall stability in the
international banking system”73 It was the first major TRN in financial regulation.
TRNs usually share several characteristics: their members are not states but
specialized regulatory agencies; they are not created by treaty and have no
international legal personality; they lack formal assemblies or voting procedures;
the instruments they promulgate are not internationally binding; and, at least until
recently, they do not systematically monitor or enforce compliance with those
instruments.74 Over the following decades, TRNs became the backbone of IFR,
with formal organizations like the IMF, World Bank, and BIS playing only a
supporting role.75
The evolution of IFR prior to the subprime crisis can be divided into three major
phases. The first, between 1974 and the Asian financial crisis in 1997−98, saw the
creation of the principal TRNs—the Basel Committee, IOSCO, and the
International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS)76—and the development
of the first generation of international standards. In response to the bank collapses
of the 1970s, the Basel Committee adopted the Concordat, an informal agreement
on the supervision of international banks that placed primary responsibility on a
bank’s home country for supervising the solvency of a bank and its foreign
branches.77 While the Concordat allocated supervisory responsibility among
STANDARDS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM 38–39 (2007).
72. The committee was originally composed of representatives of the G-10, plus
Switzerland and Luxembourg. LOWENFELD, supra note 20, at 812 n.26. On the origins of the
Basel Committee, see CHARLES GOODHART, THE BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING
SUPERVISION (2011); LOWENFELD, supra note 20, at 804; JOSEPH JUDE NORTON, DEVISING
INTERNATIONAL BANK SUPERVISORY STANDARDS (1995); DUNCAN WOOD, GOVERNING
GLOBAL BANKING: THE BASEL COMMITTEE AND THE POLITICS OF FINANCIAL GLOBALISATION
(2005); Arner & Buckley, supra note 34, at 198, 201–04.
73. KAPSTEIN, supra note 70, at 45 (emphasis by Kapstein omitted) (quoting George
Blunden, Control and Supervision of the Foreign Operations of Banks, in THE
DEVELOPMENT OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS IN EUROPE, 1956-1976, at 195 (J. Wilson et. al
eds., 1977)).
74. See Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of International Cooperation:
Transgovernmental Networks and the Future of International Law, 43 VA. J. INT’L L. 1
(2002); Verdier, supra note 2; David Zaring, Informal Procedure, Hard and Soft, in
International Administration, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L. 547 (2005) [hereinafter Zaring, Informal
Procedure]; David Zaring, International Law by Other Means: The Twilight Existence of
International Financial Regulatory Organizations, 33 TEX. INT’L L.J. 281 (1998)
[hereinafter Zaring, International Law].
75. On the role of the BIS, see LOWENFELD, supra note 20, at 756.
76. The Basel Committee was established in 1974, IOSCO in 1984, and the IAIS in
1994. See Zaring, International Law, supra note 74, at 287, 292, 297.
77. COMM. ON BANKING REGULATIONS & SUPERVISORY PRACTICES, REPORT TO THE
GOVERNORS ON THE SUPERVISION OF BANKS’ FOREIGN ESTABLISHMENTS (1975), available at
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national regulators, it stopped short of allocating corresponding financial
responsibility. 78 In other words, the Concordat designated which country should
take the lead on various aspects of supervision, but expressly refrained from
designating which country should act as lender of last resort or deposit insurer for a
given bank or its foreign offices.79 It also did not allocate authority over resolution
of failed banks—individual countries remained free to set up competing
proceedings and prioritize local creditors.
The Basel Committee’s most important achievement during that period was
undoubtedly the 1988 Basel Accord on bank capital adequacy.80 The Latin
American debt crisis of the 1980s had left international banks, especially in the
United States and the United Kingdom, severely undercapitalized.81 While
regulators in those countries wished to adopt more stringent capital adequacy
requirements, they were hampered by concerns that they would undermine the
international competitiveness of their banks.82 There was also concern that the
growing off-balance-sheet activities of banks created risks that existing standards
did not adequately reflect.83 Under pressure from the United States and the United
Kingdom, the other G-10 authorities agreed to a detailed framework for
determining mandatory capital levels for banks.84 Basel I defined regulatory capital,
established rules for weighting assets and off-balance-sheet liabilities based on
their risk, and prescribed a minimum capital ratio of 8%. Over the course of the
1990s, the Accord was adopted by many countries outside the G-10, becoming a de
facto worldwide standard.85
IOSCO developed in a somewhat different way from the Basel Committee. Its
membership was larger and its structure closer to that of a traditional international
organization, with an assembly, an executive committee, and a secretary general.86
Its formation was prompted not by an identifiable crisis, but rather by a sense that
securities regulators increasingly faced common problems, particularly in respect to
cross-border transactions. For instance, an early concern was that firms could avoid
U.S. securities fraud or insider trading laws by operating from countries whose
authorities were unable or unwilling to cooperate with the SEC. To address this
problem, the SEC entered into memoranda of understanding (MOUs) with other
securities regulators and led an IOSCO effort to promote greater uniformity among
MOUs, encourage more regulators to sign them, and help them secure domestic

www.bis.org/publ/bcbs00a.pdf. The 1975 Concordat was clarified and supplemented after
the collapses of Banco Ambrosiano in 1982 and BCCI in 1991 revealed important gaps. See
GOODHART, supra note 72, at 104–10.
78. See KAPSTEIN, supra note 70, at 49.
79. See id.
80. COMM. ON BANKING REGULATIONS AND SUPERVISORY PRACTICES, INTERNATIONAL
CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL STANDARDS (1988).
81. See SINGER, supra note 71, at 45–58.
82. See id.
83. See GOODHART, supra note 72, at 351–58.
84. See KAPSTEIN, supra note 70, at 114–19; SINGER, supra note 71, at 58–62; Thomas
Oatley & Robert Nabors, Redistributive Cooperation: Market Failure, Wealth Transfers,
and the Basle Accord, 52 INT’L ORG. 35, 49–52 (1998).
85. See SINGER, supra note 71, at 62.
86. See PORTER, supra note 64, at 36.
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legal authority to provide assistance.87 IOSCO also initiated efforts to harmonize
regulation in some areas, for instance by preparing a model form for nonfinancial
disclosure in securities offerings. IOSCO failed, however, in its efforts to create
capital standards for securities firms.88 The last major TRN, the IAIS, was formed
only in 1994 and its activities have been much more limited; for instance, it did not
agree on solvency standards for insurance firms until the 2000s.89
During these years, some of the fastest-growing economies of Asia—Indonesia,
Thailand, South Korea, and Malaysia—faced major banking and currency crises,
and the first three resorted to IMF and World Bank assistance to face massive
currency outflows.90 These crises, along with the early 1990s Mexican crisis,
shared several features: macroeconomic imbalances, asset bubbles, lax financial
sector regulation, and tenor and currency mismatches (i.e., banks borrowing shortterm in foreign currencies to make long-term local currency loans).91 After the
crisis, a consensus developed among the international financial institutions (IFIs)
and the G-7 that weak financial regulation in those countries had been a major
cause of the crisis.92 In response, they placed a high priority on improving
regulation in developing countries to reduce the risk of future crises. The head of
the IMF declared that the “world community . . . look[ed] forward for the definition
of international standards and codes of good practices, which would be
progressively disseminated by the IMF through its surveillance.”93
The G-7 took on a more active and detailed priority-setting role for IFR. It
created a new body, the Financial Stability Forum (FSF), to coordinate the
activities of the various TRNs and develop a compendium of standards whose
implementation would be encouraged by the IFIs.94 The FSF did not develop its
own standards, but relied on the TRNs to provide substantive content.95 The Basel
Committee issued its “Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision;” IOSCO,
its “Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation;” and the IAIS, its

87. See Verdier, supra note 2, at 143–50.
88. See SINGER, supra note 71, at 67–95.
89. On the IAIS’s failure to address insurer solvency, see id. at 96–113.
90. See generally PAUL BLUSTEIN, THE CHASTENING: INSIDE THE CRISIS THAT ROCKED
THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM AND HUMBLED THE IMF (2001) (describing the Asian
financial crisis and the IMF’s response.).
91. See Ethan B. Kapstein, Architects of Stability?: International Cooperation Among
Financial Supervisors 8–9 (Monetary & Econ. Dep’t, Bank for Int’l Settlements, BIS
Working Papers No. 199, 2006).
92. See, e.g., WORKING GRP. ON STRENGTHENING FIN. SYS., REPORT OF THE WORKING
GROUP ON STRENGTHENING FINANCIAL SYSTEMS (1998); Barry Eichengreen, The
International Monetary Fund in the Wake of the Asian Crisis, in THE ASIAN FINANCIAL
CRISIS AND THE ARCHITECTURE OF GLOBAL FINANCE 170 (Gregory W. Noble & John
Ravenhill eds., 2000); Stanley Fischer, First Deputy Managing Director, Int’l Monetary
Fund, Economic Crises and the Financial Sector (Dec. 10, 1998).
93. MICHEL CAMDESSUS, Toward a New Financial Architecture for a Globalized World
(May 8, 1998), in NAVIGATING STORMY, UNCHARTED WATERS: FIVE ADDRESSES BY MICHEL
CAMDESSUS 13, 16 (1998).
94. See DANIEL W. DREZNER, ALL POLITICS IS GLOBAL: EXPLAINING INTERNATIONAL
REGULATORY REGIMES 135–37 (2008).
95. See id.
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“Insurance Core Principles.”96 These principles established basic requirements
across a range of issues, often referencing existing standards such as the Basel
Accord. Many of the recommendations were structural, steering developing
countries towards creating regulatory systems based on Western models. For
example, all three sets of principles required that they set up independent regulatory
agencies and give them adequate enforcement powers and resources.97 The G-20
was also created at that time to give a voice to leading developing countries,
although its influence was limited.98 Finally, the IMF encouraged reforms by
linking them to its lending programs and conducting audits of national regulation
under two programs, ROSC and FSAP.99
The third phase runs from 2001 to the subprime crisis. During that period, the
IFIs’ work on implementing financial standards continued, but regulators and
TRNs turned their attention to various other problems.100 After September 11,
2001, a major effort was made to step up the fight against money laundering and
terrorist financing. Led by the United States, the Financial Action Task Force
(FATF) coordinated a campaign to compel offshore financial centers (OFCs) to
improve their cooperation with onshore jurisdictions under threat of “blacklisting”
and sanctions, with reluctant assistance from the IMF.101 IOSCO strove to
strengthen cross-border assistance by adopting the 2002 Multilateral Memorandum
of Understanding (MMOU). All IOSCO members were expected to sign the
MMOU, which required prior screening to ensure they had the necessary domestic
authority to comply with assistance requests.102 IOSCO has also been engaged in a
multitude of projects to develop recommendations on credit rating agencies, mutual
funds, hedge funds, securities analysts, and others. More importantly, the IASB
made great strides in developing a comprehensive set of international accounting
standards. The European Union decided to adopt them in 2002, followed by several
other countries.103 The SEC recently decided to permit foreign issuers to report
under IFRS and is considering adopting them for U.S. issuers as well.104

96. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, CORE PRINCIPLES FOR EFFECTIVE BANKING
SUPERVISION (1997) [hereinafter EFFECTIVE BANKING SUPERVISION], available at http://
www.bis.org/publ/bcbs30a.pdf; INT’L ASS’N OF INS. SUPERVISORS, INSURANCE CORE PRINCIPLES
(2000) [hereinafter INSURANCE CORE PRINCIPLES] available at http://www1.worldbank.org/
finance/assets/images/Insurance_Core_Principles.pdf; INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS
OBJECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES OF SECURITIES REGULATION (1998) [hereinafter OBJECTIVES AND
PRINCIPLES], available at http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD82.pdf.
97. See EFFECTIVE BANKING SUPERVISION, supra note 96, at 4; INSURANCE CORE
PRINCIPLES, supra note 96, at 6–7; OBJECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES, supra note 96, at 11.
98. See DREZNER, supra note 94, at 145–47.
99. See id. at 139–42.
100. The IMF also saw a significant reduction in lending in the 2000s, which reduced its
revenues and led to staff cuts. Chris Bryant & Krishna Guha, IMF Cost Cuts Spur 590 Staff
to Seek Redundancy, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 30, 2008, at 9.
101. See DREZNER, supra note 94, at 142–45.
102. See Brummer, How International Financial Law Works, supra note 1, at 300–02.
103. See Council Regulation 1606/2002 of 19 July 2002 on the Application of
International Accounting Standards, 2002 O.J. (L 243) 1 (EC) (laying the framework for the
adoption of IFRS in Europe). For a current overview of IFRS adopting around the world, see
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, IFRS ADOPTION BY COUNTRY (2012), available at http://
www.pwc.com/us/en/issues/ifrs-reporting/country-adoption/index.jhtml.
104. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, COMMISSION STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF CONVERGENCE AND
GLOBAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS 6 (2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/
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The most emblematic development of the 2000s was the decade-long effort to
develop the Basel II Accord.105 Over the 1990s, the original Accord came under
increasing criticism, mainly on the grounds that its risk-weighting formulas were
outdated relative to the internal risk measurement systems developed by the largest
banks.106 In 1999, the Basel Committee released a major revision that uses
parameters generated by banks to calculate the risk of each exposure. The
development of Basel II was long and controversial, and the committee engaged in
an elaborate notice-and-comment process.107 The debate did not stop with the
adoption of the final international document in 2004; U.S. implementation proved
intensely contentious, and Basel II is not yet fully implemented there.108
Throughout the 2000s, the Basel Committee’s attention was dominated, if not
monopolized, by Basel II—perhaps to the detriment of other important issues like
liquidity management or cross-border resolution. The IAIS, for its part, finally
published a common framework for assessing insurer solvency in 2007, albeit one
much less prescriptive and detailed than the Basel Committee’s.109 Like Basel II,
the IAIS framework provides insurers considerable flexibility to use their own risk
management models.110
This brief overview supports some general observations on the origins of IFR.
First, unlike in many other areas of international cooperation, national regulators
rather than governments played the leading role. Without a formal organization to
coordinate their action, they stepped beyond their traditional domestic role to
pursue common objectives, limiting themselves at each step to the problems
immediately facing them.111 Second, the outcome was the creation of a system
based, not on binding rules and institutions, but on informal networks and soft law
arrangements. Even after the Asian crisis, the role of IFIs was limited to overseeing
implementation of basic standards by developing countries, and they almost always
relied on TRNs to develop their content.112 Third, the usual preference was to
develop very general standards that outlined the essential desiderata of a sound
domestic regulatory system, rather than detailed prescriptions. Looking through the
FSF’s compendium of standards, the few detailed prescriptive ones like the Basel
Accord stand out against numerous general, sometimes hortatory, statements.
Finally, several pivotal areas of financial regulation with cross-border implications,
like bank resolution, deposit insurance, the lender of last resort function, bank
2010/33-9109.pdf.
105. See TARULLO, supra note 2.
106. Id. at 87–93.
107. See Michael S. Barr & Geoffrey P. Miller, Global Administrative Law: The View
from Basel, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 15 (2006).
108. See Pierre-Hugues Verdier, US Implementation of Basel II: Lessons for Informal
International Lawmaking, in INFORMAL INTERNATIONAL LAWMAKING 437 (Joost Pauwelyn,
Ramses A. Wessel, & Jan Wouters eds., 2012).
109. See INT’L ASS’N OF INS. SUPERVISORS, THE IAIS COMMON STRUCTURE FOR THE
ASSESSMENT OF INSURER SOLVENCY (2007).
110. See Elizabeth F. Brown, The Development of International Norms for Insurance
Regulation, 34 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 953, 963–70 (2009).
111. See PORTER, supra note 64, at 33–34. In this respect, IFR by networks is analogous
to informal monetary policy coordination that also emerged in the 1970s. See BRAITHWAITE
& DRAHOS, supra note 58, at 100–01.
112. See supra notes 94–97 and accompanying text.
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liquidity, and capital adequacy for securities and insurance firms, remained
essentially untouched.113 The next Part turns to the politics of IFR to explain these
outcomes.
II. THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL REGULATION
In its early years, IFR did not attract much attention from lawyers or political
scientists. Since the mid-1990s, however, an extensive literature has emerged. A
salient question has been why, unlike other areas of international cooperation, IFR
relies almost exclusively on TRNs and soft law. To answer this question, most
scholars draw on rational choice theories of international law and institutions. After
reviewing these arguments, this Part argues that contemporary IFR is better
explained by a combination of historical path dependence and political economy. It
then draws on these perspectives to explain the respective role and motivations of
three dominant actors in IFR—specialized regulators, financial firms, and great
power governments. Finally, based on this analysis, it articulates several
hypotheses to explain outcomes in IFR based on the interests of these actors. These
hypotheses will be deployed in Part III to explain variations in the success of IFR
across different areas.
A. Rational Choice Theories of IFR
In recent years, rational choice theories of international law have become
increasingly influential.114 In essence, these theories posit that states rationally
design international agreements and institutions in order to achieve joint gains.115
As a result, their features can be explained by the nature of the cooperation problem
the relevant states face. For instance, states that wish to attain a collective goal like
trade liberalization, but know that each will have incentives to defect, are more
likely to establish institutions like the WTO with monitoring, dispute resolution,
and enforcement powers.116 By contrast, in simple coordination problems where
participants do not have incentives to cheat, such costly features are unnecessary
and states will eschew them. The same reasoning has been applied to many other
design choices such as more or less precise obligations, renegotiation or withdrawal
clauses, membership criteria, and the scope of issues covered.117 In each case, states

113. On the failure of early efforts by the Basel Committee to address some of these
questions, see GOODHART, supra note 72, at 37–40, 327–35, 378–80.
114. See, e.g., JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW (2005); ANDREW T. GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS: A RATIONAL CHOICE
THEORY (2008); ROBERT E. SCOTT & PAUL B. STEPHAN, THE LIMITS OF LEVIATHAN:
CONTRACT THEORY AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2006); Barbara
Koremenos, Charles Lipson & Duncan Snidal, The Rational Design of International
Institutions, 55 INT’L ORG. 761 (2001).
115. See, e.g., GUZMAN, supra note 114, at 121.
116. See Barbara Koremenos, When, What, and Why Do States Choose to Delegate?, 71
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 151, 168–169 (2008).
117. See, e.g., Barbara Koremenos, Contracting Around International Uncertainty, 99
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 549, 551–53, 561 (2005); Barbara Koremenos, If Only Half of
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rationally choose the approach that best balances costs and benefits and therefore
maximizes joint gains.
Rational choice theory has important implications for the choice between “hard
law” and “soft law” in international regulation. On the one hand, legally binding
agreements allow states to make more credible commitments to one another. Ex
ante, ratification of formal treaties is more difficult and costly, and therefore
unattractive to states that do not intend to comply. Ex post, violations are easier to
identify, states that commit them suffer greater reputational costs, and monitoring
and enforcement can be delegated to institutions with the authority to impose
sanctions.118 As a result, formal legal obligations are most valuable when the
potential for opportunism is high and the credibility of commitments is
important.119 On the other hand, while soft law agreements provide weaker
incentives for compliance, they have several advantages. They are easier and faster
to conclude because they do not require cumbersome domestic ratification
procedures. Since they are negotiated by specialized regulators or other experts
rather than politicians, technical questions can be resolved based on shared expert
knowledge. Since they are not binding, they provide flexibility to adjust the
obligations as circumstances change.120 Finally, international regulation is often
said to address technical issues where opportunism is not a threat.121 In sum,
rational choice theory suggests that, where the costs of hard law exceed the
benefits, states will rationally choose soft law.
Several scholars have applied such an analysis to explain why IFR relies on
TRNs and soft law standards. Ethan Kapstein, after analyzing the creation and
evolution of the Basel Committee up to the early 1990s, concluded that banking
regulators successfully used informal cooperation to maintain effective regulatory
control over international banks without compromising national responsibility.122
Roberta Karmel and Claire Kelly argue that soft law works well for securities
regulation because it provides speed, flexibility, and experience in regulating everchanging markets.123 Chris Brummer acknowledges that IFR sometimes involves
more difficult cooperation problems and the risk of opportunism. However, he
argues that unlike other soft law, IFR has significant coercive power because
pressures from markets and IFIs compel states to comply, and because regulators
wish to protect their reputation vis-à-vis their peers.124 Such explanations dovetail
International Agreements Have Dispute Resolution Provisions, Which Half Needs
Explaining?, 36 J. LEGAL. STUD. 189 (2007).
118. See BETH A. SIMMONS, MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN
DOMESTIC POLITICS 118–121 (2009); SCOTT & STEPHAN, supra note 114, at 147–51.
119. See Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International
Governance, in LEGALIZATION AND WORLD POLITICS 37, 45 (Judith L. Goldstein, Miles
Kahler, Robert O. Keohane & Anne-Marie Slaughter. eds., 2001); Andrew T. Guzman &
Timothy L. Meyer, International Soft Law, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 171 (2010).
120. See Charles Lipson, Why Are Some International Agreements Informal?, 45 INT’L
ORG. 495 (1991); Kal Raustiala, Form and Substance in International Agreements, 99 AM. J.
INT’L L. 581 (2005).
121. See GUZMAN, supra note 114, at 157; Raustiala, supra note 120, at 600.
122. See KAPSTEIN, supra note 70, at 180.
123. See Karmel & Kelly, supra note 1, at 890–98.
124. See BRUMMER, supra note 1; Brummer, How International Financial Law Works,
supra note 1; Brummer, Why Soft Law Dominates International Finance—And Not Trade,
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with earlier theories that emphasized the beneficial role of transnational networks
of experts in devising common regulatory standards.125
Despite its strengths, I argue that rational design theory provides an incomplete
account of IFR. First, it does not explain the substantial variation in outcomes
across issue areas. For instance, while there are elaborate international standards for
bank capital adequacy, similar rules for securities firms and insurance failed. Even
in banking, some areas like cross-border resolution have seen minimal progress. In
general, progress has been highly uneven across IFR, and has sometimes been
reversed outright. At a minimum, this state of affairs should cast doubt on the
functionalist reasoning proposed by much rational choice scholarship, which
effectively “attributes the creation of an international institution to the underlying
global need that it putatively addresses.”126 Such reasoning often fails to provide a
convincing explanation of the agents and processes that actually determine the
emergence or failure of cooperation. It is possible that states optimally design IFR;
but it may also be shaped by other factors like historical path dependence,127
coercion by powerful states, the private interests of regulators, or the political
influence of the industry.128
Second, the assumption that IFR is optimally designed predisposes scholars to
neglect issues of compliance and effectiveness. Some are impressed by the sheer
multiplication of international bodies, reports, and standards. But IFR cannot be
judged by the quantity of its outputs.129 International standards can avoid difficult
areas on which regulators disagree; they can paper over differences with
meaningless formulas that merely restate existing practices; they can preserve

supra note 1.
125. See PORTER, supra note 64, at 43–44, 57; SLAUGHTER, supra note 1, at 167;
Raustiala, supra note 74; Zaring, Informal Procedure, supra note 74; Stefano Pagliari,
Pushed to the Sidelines? IOSCO and the Changing Role of International Regulatory
Institutions After the Crisis 1011 (April 30, 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the
Indiana Law Journal). Other scholars take a much dimmer view, seeing TRNs as creeping
expert governance detached from genuine public accountability. See, e.g., Philip Alston, The
Myopia of the Handmaidens: International Lawyers and Globalization, 3 EUR. J. INT’L L.
435 (1997); David Kennedy, The Politics of the Invisible College: International Governance
and the Politics of Expertise, 5 EUR. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 463 (2001); Sol Picciotto, Networks
in International Economic Integration: Fragmented States and the Dilemmas of NeoLiberalism, 17 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 1014 (1997); Richard B. Stewart, The Global
Regulatory Challenge to U.S. Administrative Law, 37 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 695 (2005).
126. SINGER, supra note 71, at 5; see also Paul Pierson, The Limits of Design: Explaining
Institutional Origins and Change, 13 GOVERNANCE 475, 475 (2000) (defining “functionalist
reasoning” as “the explanation of institutional forms [by] their functional consequences for
those who create them”); BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 58, at 17.
127. On this concept, see infra Part II.B.
128. Thus, Oatley, and Nabors argue that the Basel Accord was imposed coercively on
Japan by the United States and the U.K. to protect their banks against competition. See
Oatley & Nabors, supra note 84.
129. This point was brilliantly articulated by Kenneth Anderson: “Networks held
meetings, wrote papers, made recommendations, and drafted statements. To be sure, this is
what networks must do in order to create successful outcomes . . . .Yet unfortunately this is
also precisely the procedure followed when networks create unsuccessful outcomes.”
Anderson, supra note 2, at 1278 (emphasis in original).
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extensive national discretion that is then abused. Even when meaningful standards
are adopted, compliance is hard to monitor;130 later revisions can compromise the
original objective;131 and seemingly well-established standards can retreat as
domestic politics shift.132 Therefore, a satisfactory theory of IFR cannot avoid
asking to what extent it actually requires states to depart from what they would
otherwise do, and whether they comply when faced with competing pressures.
Third, the widespread argument that market pressures play a pivotal role in
enforcing IFR standards—thus compensating for the lack of formal monitoring or
enforcement—raises both empirical and theoretical difficulties.133 In a study of East
Asian financial reforms after the 1997 crisis, Andrew Walter finds that
governments were caught between external market and IFI pressure to adopt
international standards and intense resistance from powerful domestic
constituencies: politically connected oligarchs, industrial conglomerates, and large
banks. He finds that, since markets and IFIs are able to identify and reward formal
but not substantive compliance, governments adopted a strategy of “mock
compliance”—formally adopting the standards while ignoring them in practice.134
These findings challenge the hypothesis that market pressures can deliver
compliance with IFR. More fundamentally, the logic of the hypothesis is flawed
with respect to prudential rules that force private firms to internalize social costs,
and therefore make them less profitable.135 In such cases, there is reason to be
concerned that markets will reward firms and countries that circumvent the rules,
not punish them. Thus, a better account is needed of where market pressures can
play a positive role, and where they may be ineffective or counterproductive.
B. Historical Path Dependence and IFR
In fact, there are at least two major reasons to doubt that soft law and TRNs
maximize joint gains for states. The first is historical path dependence—the notion
that the original design of institutions can constrain their future evolution and

130. See, e.g., ANDREW WALTER, GOVERNING FINANCE: EAST ASIA’S ADOPTION OF
INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS 42–43 (2008).
131. See TARULLO, supra note 2; see also SINGER, supra note 71, at 65–66.
132. See Stavros Gadinis, From Independence to Politics in Banking Regulations (Aug,
27, 2012) (unpublished manuscript) (describing the retreat of the independence of financial
regulators after the financial crisis), available at http://ssrn.com/abstact=2137215.
133. Almost every scholar writing in the field offers some version of it, often referring to
widespread adoption of standards such as the Basel Accord and the IOSCO MMOU. See,
e.g., KAPSTEIN, supra note 70, at 13, 126, 184; SINGER, supra note 71, at 9–10, 123;
Brummer, How International Financial Law Works, supra note 1, at 286–88; Beth A.
Simmons, The International Politics of Harmonization: The Case of Capital Market
Regulation, 55 INT’L ORG. 589, 601–05 (2001). Other standards are cited in Hyoung-Kyu
Chey, Do Markets Enhance Convergence on International Standards?: The Case of
Financial Regulation, 1 REG. & GOV. 295, 296 n.8 (2007).
134. See WALTER, supra note 130, at 36–49, 166–77. Walter defines mock compliance as
“a combination of considerable formal compliance with international standards and
behavioral departure from their prescriptions.” Id. at 171.
135. See infra Part III.B.4.
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prevent efficient adaptation to changed circumstances.136 As scholars working in
this tradition point out, institutions are often not optimally designed in the first
place.137 However, even if one assumes that they are, their original design
constrains their capacity to evolve in response to changed circumstances. As Paul
Pierson notes, “[a]ctors do not inherit a blank slate that they can remake at will
when their preferences shift or unintended consequences become visible. Instead,
actors find that the dead weight of previous institutional choices seriously limits
their room to maneuver.”138 They face path dependence, which Orfeo Fioretos
defines as “a process in which the structure that prevails after a specific moment in
time (often a critical juncture) shapes the subsequent trajectory in ways that make
alternative institutional designs substantially less likely to triumph, including those
that would be more efficient.”139
There are several ways in which past choices may constrain future options.
Some scholars have suggested psychological explanations. Douglass North argues
that actors operating in highly complex and opaque areas filter new information
through their existing “mental maps,”140 so that mistaken intellectual outlooks
remain uncorrected. Other scholars emphasize political explanations, in particular
the “lock-in effect” that arises from existing commitments.141 Thus, Fioretos notes
that “because interest groups frequently owe their position of power to the strategic
position occupied at the founding moment of an institution . . . [they] often see
greater benefits from reproducing extant arrangements than from embracing radical
change.”142 Several other phenomena may also reinforce path dependence:
institutions often create network externalities, generate increasing returns, and
become interconnected with other institutions, reinforcing each other against
change.143 In these circumstances, institutional change will be limited and
incremental, adaptation that would produce collective gains will not occur, and
institutions will outlive their rationale.144 Actors will respond to new problems with

136. On historical approaches to institutional origins and change, see, for example, Orfeo
Fioretos, Historical Institutionalism in International Relations, 65 INT’L ORG. 367 (2011);
Pierson, supra note 126.
137. The original design of institutions may not be optimal because the actors involved
may not act instrumentally, they may be pursuing short-term goals, and their actions may
have unintended consequences. See Pierson, supra note 126, at 477–86. The rational design
hypothesis is also more problematical for political than it is for economic markets, because
outcomes are difficult to measure, reforms are contentious, and the goals themselves are
multifaceted and complex. See id. at 482 (citing Douglass C. North, A Transaction Cost
Theory of Politics, 2 J. THEORETICAL POL. 355, 362 (1990)).
138. Pierson, supra note 126, at 493; see also PAUL PIERSON, POLITICS IN TIME 151
(2004).
139. Fioretos, supra note 136, at 376 (footnote omitted).
140. See DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE 8 (1990).
141. See Pierson, supra note 126, at 491–92.
142. Fioretos, supra note 136, at 376.
143. See id. at 377.
144. See id. at 377–78.
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“institutional layering,” creating subsidiary organizations with limited authority
alongside existing arrangements.145
The notion of historical path dependence provides a fruitful perspective on the
development of IFR. The current system was not created in a vacuum; its formation
has been deeply affected by history. The Bretton Woods negotiations were the
critical juncture in the construction of modern international economic law. The
participants, however, did not believe an institution was needed to regulate private
international finance and did not design one.146 This omission made sense in its
historical context: international finance was highly atrophied after the Great
Depression and World War II, and the new monetary system contemplated strict
and permanent limits on private capital flows.147 However, these expectations were
soon defeated. The fixed rate system collapsed. Financial globalization took off and
created many new cross-border regulatory challenges.
In the absence of an international institution, national regulators took the
initiative, but they faced several constraints. Their options were limited by their
domestic statutory authority, which they could not easily change. They did not have
a clear mandate to act internationally, much less bind their state to legal
obligations. They did not have a forum in which to meet; often they did not even
know each other.148 In that context, regulators proceeded incrementally by creating
informal networks to exchange ideas, coordinate their actions, and agree on
nonbinding standards. This was another critical juncture where the choices made
shaped IFR for decades. Today, despite its limitations, it is difficult for politicians,
regulators, and even scholars to conceive of a different system. More importantly,
these foundational choices empowered specific actors—specialized regulators,
financial firms, and great powers—that now occupy a central place in IFR.
C. The Political Economy of IFR
Beyond the historical dimension of IFR, the conventional account also neglects
its political dimension. This section attempts to remedy this shortcoming by
focusing on three important categories of political actors, the means they have to
influence IFR, and the interests they try to advance. First, IFR is typically not made
directly by states through their diplomatic representatives, but by specialized
regulatory agencies that have some freedom to advance their own interests. This
creates a principal-agent problem. Second, the financial industry has ample means
and opportunities to influence IFR both at the formation and implementation
stages, as well as a strong interest in doing so. This introduces an element of special
interest politics. Finally, states are not homogenous in their interests and
capabilities. The great economic powers disproportionately influence outcomes.
Thus, interstate power relationships also matter to IFR.

145.
146.
147.
148.

See id. at 388–90.
See supra notes 40–41 and accompanying text.
See supra Part I.A.
See supra Part I.C.
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1. The Role of National Regulators
In most countries, the legislature delegates extensive authority to promulgate
and enforce financial regulation to expert bureaucrats. While in the past this
authority was often exercised by a department of the executive branch, the more
recent trend has been to delegate regulatory powers to the central bank or to create
specialized independent agencies such as securities, banking, and commodities
commissions. As seen above, these specialized national regulators emerged as the
primary actors in IFR when the modern system took shape in the 1970s. They
initiated the formation of the principal TRNs and defined their mandate; they set
the agenda for developing international standards; and they typically control their
domestic implementation. Therefore, in order to understand modern IFR, one must
begin with the incentives and constraints under which these specialized regulators
operate.
Administrative agencies are typically not subject to direct electoral discipline.
Instead, they exercise powers delegated by the legislature and are subject to its
oversight. In theory, the legislature has many tools to discipline regulators: it can
override their policies by legislation, dismiss them from their jobs, reduce the
agency’s budget, or even abolish it altogether—as recently happened to the U.S.
Office of Thrift Supervision149 and the U.K. Financial Services Authority.150 For
several reasons, however, the performance of regulators is difficult for the
legislature to monitor consistently. The public benefits of regulation are often hard
to measure; the agency is usually insulated from competitive pressures; and the
compensation of regulators is, at best, indirectly related to results.151 In addition,
the agency possesses specialized expertise and information that is difficult and
costly for the legislature to acquire.152 As a result, regulators may be able to pursue
self-serving objectives rather than those intended by the legislature—such as
maximizing agency budget, minimizing effort, advancing personal policy
preferences, or pursuing individual career objectives.
The literature on administrative decision making characterizes the relationship
between the legislature and agencies as a principal-agent problem. While it is
impossible to ensure perfect compliance, the legislature has several means at its
disposal to provide agencies with incentives to follow its preferred policies. It can
adopt detailed legislation that delegates less discretion to regulators and exposes
them to judicial review. It can reduce information asymmetry by establishing
specialized committees to monitor the agencies. It can also adopt mandatory

149. See 12 U.S.C. § 5413 (Supp. IV 2010).
150. See George Parker & Brooke Masters, Osborne Abolishes FSA and Boosts Bank,
FIN. TIMES (London), June 16, 2010.
151. See DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE III 362–63 (2003).
152. See WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT
29–30 (1971). These characteristics are shared by most financial regulatory agencies. It
should be noted, however, that some important financial regulators—including central banks
like the U.S. Federal Reserve—benefit from a greater degree of independence, in the form of
longer appointments, independent sources of funding, and insulation from some
administrative procedure and oversight rules that apply to other parts of government. In their
case, the argument developed in this section applies more strongly.
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administrative procedures, such as the notice and comment requirements of the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA), to ensure that new agency proposals will be
publicized and that constituents will have a time and venue to air their
objections.153 The legislature also relies on interest groups to support its monitoring
functions by raising the alarm if a proposed action adversely affects their
interests.154
This principal-agent problem is particularly acute in financial regulation.
Financial transactions and institutions have become increasingly complex as a
result of technological and market developments, which means that the rules are
also complex and require frequent revision. Accordingly, the legislature often
delegates extensive rule-making authority to financial regulators, accompanied by
very general statutory objectives—the SEC’s mandate, for instance, is to “protect
investors, maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitate capital
formation.”155 In turn, this means that courts can play only a relatively minor role in
policing substantive policy decisions by regulators, as long as they follow
applicable procedural requirements.156 While agencies face direct oversight by the
legislature, the expertise gap between regulators and legislators and the difficulty of
measuring the effectiveness of regulatory policy means that such oversight tends to
be reactive, that is, to occur after a crisis has revealed regulatory failures. Interest
groups may also raise the alarm, but since the principal interest group concerned
with financial regulation is the industry itself, these interventions prioritize its own
interests.
David Singer’s work on international capital standards illustrates this
phenomenon. In line with the literature described above, he finds that the primary
concern of regulators is to avoid legislative intervention.157 The problem, however,
is that setting capital standards involves a tradeoff: higher requirements reduce the
frequency of bank failures and their cost to taxpayers, but they also reduce the
profitability of banks and harm their international competitiveness. Thus, pressure
on the legislature—and ultimately on regulators—may come from two opposite
directions. If standards are too low, more failures will occur and the public will
demand stronger regulation; if they are too high, the industry will complain about
loss of competitiveness and demand lighter regulation.158

153. See Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Administrative
Procedures as Instruments of Political Control, 3 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 243, 253–64 (1987).
154. See Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight
Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165, 165–69 (1984).
155. The Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market
Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://
www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last modified Oct. 12, 2012).
156. In recent years, U.S. courts have taken a somewhat more active role in striking down
agency regulations. See infra note 178 and accompanying text. However, this phenomenon
remains marginal given the enormous amount of rule-making initiated by the Dodd-Frank
Act.
157. See SINGER, supra note 71, at 22.
158. See id. at 22–23. By emphasizing the private incentives of regulators, this approach
is close to public choice accounts of IFR. See, e.g., Enrico Colombatto & Jonathan R.
Macey, A Public Choice Model of International Economic Cooperation and the Decline of
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In normal circumstances, regulators can balance these pressures by setting
domestic regulation within a “win-set” acceptable to both constituencies.159 The
problem is that this win-set migrates over time and may even disappear. For
instance, after a financial crisis, there is substantial pressure from the public for
stronger regulation. By contrast, in favorable economic times, the financial industry
presses the legislature to reduce the costs and burdens of regulation.160 Thus, Singer
shows that in the late 1980s, both U.S. and U.K. banks faced heavy losses resulting
from the Latin American debt crisis and growing competition by Japanese banks.161
As a result, the interests of U.S. and U.K. regulators were closely aligned in
seeking an agreement on capital standards that would satisfy domestic political
demand for stronger regulation without further compromising their banks’
international competitive position. This exceptional situation resulted in the
adoption of the 1988 Basel Accord. By contrast, efforts in the early 1990s to create
international capital standards for securities firms failed in the absence of domestic
political demand in major jurisdictions.162 Singer’s work reveals that the behavior
of national regulators in IFR is driven by domestic political pressures; it also
suggests that since demand for stricter regulation usually comes from the public
after crises, it is likely to fade over time, allowing the industry to reassert its
influence.
In sum, financial regulators face constraints on their authority due to the
possibility of legislative intervention. However, such intervention is relatively
unusual and its direction is inconsistent—it oscillates between laxity and stringency
in response to domestic factors such as financial crises, changes in the financial
industry, and changes in the legislature. It is also imperfect, because the
legislature’s capacity to monitor the massive and complex body of financial
regulation is limited, agencies can sometimes circumvent procedural constraints on
policy making, and punishing the agency by legislative action is often politically
difficult or costly.163 In such an uncertain and changing environment, can any
general prediction be made with respect to the behavior of financial regulators
engaged in IFR?
As will be seen, there is one constant: regulators place a very high priority on
preserving their domestic autonomy, flexibility, and discretion. They are, in
Singer’s words, “reluctant diplomats” whose “penchant for international standardsetting emerges only when they are unable to fulfill their domestic mandates with

the Nation State, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 925 (1996). The difference is that while most public
choice accounts posit that financial regulators are captured by the industry, this account
recognizes that they sometimes face strong pressures to adopt policies that the industry
resists. See Kapstein, supra note 91, at 4–5.
159. See SINGER, supra note 71, at 23–25.
160. See id. at 25–30.
161. See id. at 41–62.
162. See id. at 76–95.
163. See John Ferejohn & Charles Shipan, Congressional Influence on Bureaucracy, 6 J.
L. ECON. & ORG. 1 (1990) (proposing a model that incorporates limits on congressional
action, such as the presidential veto); McCubbins et al., supra note 153, at 248–53
(describing various costs and limitations of legislative oversight); David B. Spence,
Administrative Law and Agency Policy-Making: Rethinking the Positive Theory of Political
Control, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 407, 421-38 (1997) (same).
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unilateral regulation.”164 While they welcome informal cooperative arrangements
with their counterparts, they are usually unwilling to commit in advance to binding
rules or specific courses of action. They are even more reluctant to submit to
international oversight or to be perceived as judging the performance of their
peers.165 They also resist standards whose domestic implementation would require
legislation and prefer less ambitious ones that they can implement under their
existing authority. No doubt, these preferences can be explained to some degree by
legitimate public interests, such as the need for flexibility, speed, and expertise to
keep up with financial markets. But they are also driven by the private interest of
regulators in maximizing their policy discretion, placating powerful domestic
constituencies, and navigating changing political demands from the legislature. As
will be seen, this imposes significant constraints on their ability to make credible
commitments internationally and hinders cooperation in some areas of IFR.
2. The Role of the Financial Industry
The second major political actor in IFR is the financial industry itself. To
understand its role in IFR, the starting point is the literature on special interest
politics. Many groups try to influence public policy to favor their interests; they can
do so by lobbying policymakers or the public directly, or by supplying politicians
with votes or money.166 In a classic work, Mancur Olson argued that such efforts
suffer from collective action problems and free riding. These problems are easier to
overcome if the relevant group is relatively small, the potential benefits of
collective action for individual members are large, and the organization also
provides noncollective services to its members.167 More generally, interest groups
that benefit from superior technical expertise, organization, and financial resources
are thought to enjoy an advantage in influencing policy making.
In the era of financial globalization, the financial industry in developed
economies has become increasingly concentrated.168 In 1970, the five largest U.S.
banks controlled 17% of banking industry assets; in 2010, they controlled 52%.169
In major European jurisdictions, the number of banks declined steadily while total
assets increased;170 the market share of the five largest banks averaged 58.9% in

164. SINGER, supra note 71, at ix; see also KAPSTEIN, supra note 70, at 50, 56.
165. This is a recurring theme in many Basel Committee documents cited in Charles
Goodhart’s recent history. See, e.g., GOODHART, supra note 72, at 110–13, 289–91, 421–22,
549–51.
166. See MUELLER, supra note 151, at 472–500.
167. See generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965).
168. See Allen N. Berger, Philip Molyneux & John O.S. Wilson, Banking: An Overview,
in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF BANKING 1, 13 (Allen N. Berger, Philip Molyneux & John
O.S. Wilson eds,. 2010).
169. See Harvey Rosenblum, Choosing the Road to Prosperity: Why We Must End Too
Big to Fail—Now, in FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS, 2011 ANNUAL REPORT 2, 6
exhibit 2 (2012).
170. See John Goddard, Philip Molyneux & John O.S. Wilson, Banking in the European
Union, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF BANKING, supra note 168, at 807, 827.
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E.U. member states in 2006.171 In the United States, Europe, and Japan, regulatory
reforms relaxed internal geographical barriers to bank expansion; abolished
restrictions on integration of banking, insurance, and securities services; and
facilitated access by foreign financial firms.172 Developed country banks expanded
internationally, notably in Eastern Europe and Latin America.173 Overall, as a result
of market, technological, and policy changes, the trend has been towards
consolidation and the emergence of large, internationally active financial firms.
These firms have many points of entry to influence policy making. The APA’s
notice and comment process allows them to learn of proposed agency rules,
comment on them, and raise the alarm in the legislature when needed. In recent
years, TRNs such as the Basel Committee have voluntarily adopted similar
procedures in an effort to increase transparency. The largest institutions are actively
involved in this process, both directly and through law firms and industry
organizations such as the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association
(SIFMA), the Financial Services Roundtable, the Financial Services Forum, the
Clearing House, the American Bankers Association, the Institute of International
Finance, and the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA).174 On
many financial regulation proposals, virtually all comments come from major
industry participants, with only a handful from smaller firms, consumer groups, or
the public.175 The industry also plays a leading role at the preproposal stage, where
informal contacts with regulators allow crucial input in agenda setting.176 Finally,

171. See Berger et al., supra note 168, at 15.
172. Id. at 9.
173. See John P. Bonin, Iftekhar Hasan & Paul Wachtel, Banking in Transition
Countries, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF BANKING, supra note 168, at 844; Fernando J.
Cardim de Carvalho, Luiz Fernando de Paula & Jonathan Williams, Banking in Latin
America, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF BANKING, supra note 168, at 868.
174. These organizations typically also provide noncollective services to their members,
in line with Olson’s theory. See OLSON, supra note 167, at 145. For example, in addition to
lobbying, ISDA produces standard documentation for many types of derivatives, legal
opinions as to their international enforceability, and credit event determination and dispute
resolution infrastructure for credit derivatives.
175. See Barr & Miller, supra note 107, at 24–26 (noting that most comments on Basel
II, both internationally and domestically, were from the industry). In a recent study,
Kimberly Krawiec finds that, while most rule-makings receive very few comments from the
public, an active campaign by public interest groups produced thousands of public comments
supporting strong implementation of the Volcker Rule. However, most of these comments
were short and general in nature, while industry and trade group letters were usually lengthy,
cogent, and specific. See Kimberly D. Krawiec, Don’t “Screw Joe the Plummer:” The
Sausage-Making of Financial Reform, at 25–26 (2013) (unpublished manuscript), available
at http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/2445.
176. Krawiec’s analysis of logs of informal meetings with regulators—created as part of
a new transparency initiative—shows that financial institutions, industry groups, and law
firms accounted for 93.1% of all meetings relating to the Volcker Rule, while public interest,
labor, research, and advocacy groups accounted for only 6.9%. See Krawiec, supra note 175,
at 32.
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as financial regulation becomes more complex, implementation often requires longterm cooperation between regulators and the industry.177
Beyond the rule-making process, large financial firms have many other contacts
with regulators. They continually interact with regulators in their supervisory
function, they routinely negotiate individual authorizations and exemptions, and
their employees often migrate to regulators and vice versa. When they are
unsuccessful in obtaining a favorable outcome from agencies, they sometimes turn
to judicial review. Although courts have historically deferred to regulators, the
industry has achieved some notable successes in recent years.178 Finally, the
financial industry can turn directly to politicians. It “is far and away the largest
source of campaign contributions to federal candidates and parties,”179 with total
donations of $2.8 billion between 1990 and 2012.180 Financial industry
contributions to Congress go disproportionately to members who sit on banking
and finance committees.181 Econometric studies show that industry contributions
were associated with higher likelihoods of legislators supporting repeal of the
Glass-Steagall Act,182 financial rescues for Latin America and East Asia,183 prolender bankruptcy reform,184 and adoption of the Temporary Asset Relief Program
legislation.185

177. See Verdier, supra note 108, at 466.
178. See, e.g., Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (striking down
SEC proxy access rule); Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (striking down
SEC rule regulating hedge funds); Int’l Swaps & Derivatives Ass’n v. U.S. Commodity
Futures Trading Comm’n, No. 11-cv-2146, 2012 WL 4466311 (D.D.C. Sept. 28, 2012)
(striking down CFTC position limits rule).
179. Ctr. for Responsive Politics, Finance/Insurance/Real Estate, OPENSECRETS.ORG,
http://www.opensecrets.org/industries/indus.php?Ind_F.
180. See Ctr. for Responsive Politics, Finance/Insurance/Real Estate: Long-Term
Contribution Trends, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/industries/totals.php
?cycle=2012&ind=F.
181. See Randall W. Bennett & Christine Loucks, PAC Contributions from Sectors of the
Financial Services Industry, 1998–2002, 36 ATLANTIC ECON. J. 407, 413–18 (2008); J.
Lawrence Broz, Congressional Politics of International Financial Rescues, 49 AM. J. POL.
SCI. 479, 492 (2005); Randall S. Kroszner & Thomas Stratmann, Interest-Group
Competition and the Organization of Congress: Theory and Evidence from Financial
Services’ Political Action Committees, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 1163, 1172 (1998).
182. See Thomas Stratmann, Can Special Interests Buy Congressional Votes?: Evidence
from Financial Services Legislation, 45 J. L. & ECON. 345, 357–65 (2002).
183. See Broz, supra note 181, 485–89.
184. See Stephen Nunez & Howard Rosenthal, Bankruptcy “Reform” in Congress:
Creditors, Committees, Ideology, and Floor Voting in the Legislative Process, 20 J. L. ECON.
& ORG. 527, 553–54 (2004).
185. See Atif Mian, Amir Sufi & Francesco Trebbi, The Political Economy of the US
Mortgage Default Crisis, 100 AM. ECON. REV. 1967, 1997 (2010). To be sure, other
domestic interest groups also try to influence financial regulation: smaller financial firms,
institutional investors, public companies, and consumer groups, to name a few. Their
influence, however, is likely to be less pronounced. They are more numerous and diffuse,
have access to less expertise, and have less consistent ties to regulators. They also are
primarily interested in domestic regulatory issues, and often see IFR as remote to their
interests. Finally, outside the United States, the banking industry tends to be even more
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It is important to emphasize that this Article does not propose a theory of
“regulatory capture” under which the industry systematically imposes its
preferences.186 The claim is simply that there are theoretical and empirical reasons
to believe that large financial firms exercise significant influence on policy making
both at the domestic and international level, and therefore play an important role in
shaping IFR. What, then, are their objectives? As will be seen, this often depends
on the particular policy at issue, but three general hypotheses can be advanced.
First, financial firms usually prefer policies that have lower compliance costs,
especially when these costs are imposed to advance a public goal like financial
stability but do not generate excludable private benefits. Second, they usually favor
policies that enhance their access to foreign markets, as their business model
requires extensive international reach.187 Third, they wish to benefit, as much as
possible, from explicit or implicit government guarantees that give them a
competitive edge over other firms that do not benefit from the perception of
stability associated with “too big to fail” status.188
3. The Role of the Great Powers
Finally, though day-to-day IFR is primarily the province of specialized
regulators and TRNs, their work cannot be insulated from interstate power
relationships. One manifestation of this phenomenon is that the regulators of the
largest financial markets clearly have disproportionate influence. In the early years,
U.S. regulators played a virtually hegemonic role in IFR, sometimes by being the
key players in TRNs, sometimes simply by unilaterally imposing their own
standards. Until recently, the United States required foreign companies that wished
to list their shares on a U.S. exchange to reconcile their financial statements to U.S.
GAAP, a costly and time-consuming process. The Basel capital accords, often seen
as the most successful IFR standard to date, were originally an Anglo-American
initiative, and the impetus from Basel II came from the U.S. Federal Reserve.189
Likewise, the SEC was the driving force behind the creation of IOSCO and the
network of bilateral MOUs. More recently, the European Union has become an
important player. Other countries like China, Brazil, and India are gradually joining
their ranks.
The exercise of this disproportionate influence by great power regulators in IFR
cannot be completely dissociated from broader national interests as defined by their
concentrated, with smaller institutions playing a marginal economic and political role.
186. For a prominent regulatory capture argument, see SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES KWAK,
13 BANKERS (2010); see also Geoffrey R.D. Underhill & Xiaoke Zhang, Setting the Rules:
Private Power, Political Underpinnings, and Legitimacy in Global Monetary and Financial
Governance, 84 INT’L AFF. 535 (2008). For a critique of capture arguments, see Kevin L.
Young, Transnational Regulatory Capture?: An Empirical Examination of the Transnational
Lobbying of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 19 REV. POL. ECON. 663 (2012).
187. Some large firms with a dominant position in their home market might prefer
policies that protect them from foreign competition, but this appears less common among the
largest firms, which have become increasingly transnational in nature.
188. For a more complete discussion of “too big to fail,” see infra note 310 and
accompanying text.
189. See TARULLO, supra note 2, at 89–90.
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governments. First, the government usually appoints the regulators, so they tend to
be politically aligned with it and responsive to its ideology and objectives. Second,
great power governments often determine the locus of international cooperation and
use that influence to advance their interests. For instance, when the great powers
became concerned about money laundering and terrorist financing, they steered that
issue away from the IFIs and broad-based TRNs towards the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and FATF, narrower “clubs”
over which they have better control.190 Third, great power governments sometimes
intervene directly to influence the development of financial standards. For example,
during the Basel II negotiations, German Chancellor Schröder announced he would
not support the new Accord if it was not revised to treat loans to small and medium
enterprises—the backbone of German industry—more favorably.191
To date, there have been only a few studies on the role of interstate power
relationships in IFR. Beth Simmons developed a model in which the dominant
state—usually the United States—unilaterally adopts a new standard, and smaller
“follower states” decide whether to emulate it.192 More recently, Daniel Drezner
tried to address the decline of U.S. hegemony with a more general theory based on
the interaction of “great powers” and smaller states.193 In his model, each state must
balance the adjustment costs of shifting to a new standard against the benefits of
convergence, which vary across states and economic sectors.194 In IFR, he argues
that great powers usually desire convergence while others do not.195 His main
example is the effort by the great powers to impose new international standards
after the Asian crisis, which was resisted by least-developed countries (LDCs),
because they would lose patronage opportunities afforded by political control over
the financial system, and OFCs, because they would lose their ability to attract
business through lax regulation. In response, the great powers entrust “clubs” they
control—such as the OECD, the FSF, and the BIS—to design new standards, then
enforce them against unwilling states through coercive measures like IMF
conditionality, unilateral sanctions, and shaming campaigns.196
While these are important contributions, there is currently no comprehensive
theory of the role of interstate power relationships in IFR. Drezner’s model, for
instance, treats IFR as largely unitary and therefore does not explain variation in
outcomes across different areas of IFR. Nevertheless, the literature provides
important insights on the role and objectives of the great powers. First, they are
reluctant to support the creation of binding international standards and centralized
institutions, because a more fragmented system allows them to wield their power
more freely and achieve their objectives by shifting the issue to the most favorable

190. See DREZNER, supra note 94, at 142–45.
191. See Verdier, supra note 2, at 141.
192. Simmons, supra note 133.
193. DREZNER, supra note 94, at 32–59. Drezner argues that the relevant measure is
market size and that the United States and the European Union are the “great powers.” Id. at
35–39.
194. See id. at 43–47.
195. See id. at 123–29.
196. See id. at 135–45.
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forum.197 Thus, if there is a widely shared interest in convergence in one area, they
can delegate standard setting to an intergovernmental organization; but if other
states oppose the standards, they can choose a forum where those states have less
voice. On a substantive level, the great powers may also gain less than other states
from creating strong international standards. In some instances, their regulatory
models simply diffuse to other countries because they are perceived as successful
or because of the prestige of their regulators.198 Finally, they can often impose their
policies unilaterally when needed.
Second, there are areas in which the great powers do want stronger IFR
standards because they are motivated by broader political agendas than regulators
or firms. For instance, the great powers are the principal contributors to assistance
packages to countries that face financial crises. As a result, especially after the
Asian financial crisis, they became deeply preoccupied with the quality of
regulation in developing countries and were instrumental in driving the
development of the post-Asia reform agenda and shifting monitoring responsibility
to the IMF and the World Bank.199 Beyond preventing financial crises, other
political considerations can inform their approach to IFR, including their fiscal
interest in fighting tax evasion and tax competition, their security interest in
fighting money laundering and terrorist financing, and their political interest in
using access to international finance as a sanctions mechanism or bargaining chip
against hostile groups or regimes. In such cases, great powers may intervene to
compel the TRNs to take action, or shift authority to organizations that will be
more responsive to their interests.
D. Explaining Outcomes
The previous section articulated a theoretical account of the political economy
of IFR that emphasizes the role of three categories of actors: specialized regulators,
firms, and great powers. This account provides a relatively parsimonious
explanation of the relative success of major international regulatory initiatives
across various issue areas, as will be shown in Part III. At a more general level, it
also explains the widespread reliance on soft law and TRNs in contemporary IFR.
At the micro level of individual areas of IFR, the hypothesis is that in order to
succeed, an IFR initiative must have strong support from one or more of the three
major actors, and at least passive acquiescence from the others. In other words,
each effectively wields a veto over the creation of effective international standards.

197. See BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 58, at 28–29; Eyal Benvenisti & George
W. Downs, The Empire’s New Clothes: Political Economy and the Fragmentation of
International Law, 60 STAN. L. REV. 595, 599 (2007).
198. On the phenomenon of international policy diffusion, see generally Beth A.
Simmons, Frank Dobbin & Geoffrey Garrett, Introduction: The Diffusion of Liberalization,
in THE GLOBAL DIFFUSION OF MARKETS AND DEMOCRACY 1 (Beth A. Simmons, Frank
Dobbin & Geoffrey Garrett eds. 2008).
199. Indeed, the Basel Committee itself was very reluctant to articulate general standards
of bank regulation and supervision that would be used to judge the performance of national
regulators, and only did so under pressure from the IMF. See GOODHART, supra note 72, at
438–40.
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This veto, of course, is not a formal legal prerogative like that of permanent
members of the U.N. Security Council. It simply represents the actual capacity of
each actor to defeat a new standard, either by preventing its adoption or by
defeating its effective implementation. There is one exception to this logic: in the
wake of financial crises, international prudential standards have sometimes been
adopted against the resistance of the financial industry. For example, the Basel I
accord was adopted after the Latin American debt crisis, and imposed substantial
costs on banks. As will be seen, however, the adoption of such standards is highly
exceptional; compliance is difficult to monitor and enforce; and as the crisis
recedes and the industry reasserts its influence, the standards tend to be gradually
diluted.
At the macro level, the interests of specialized regulators, financial firms, and
great power governments explain IFR’s overall preference for soft law and TRNs
over formal treaties and institutions. As a result of the historical development of
IFR, each of these actors occupies a powerful position in the current system.
Therefore, they have incentives to resist the involvement of new institutions and
actors that might challenge their position. Instead, they prefer to rely on strategies
of “institutional layering,” adding new informal bodies with limited authority and
autonomy to address new problems on an ad hoc basis. Thus, a heavy burden of
inertia weighs against the creation of stronger cooperation mechanisms. In addition,
the current system is relatively effective at achieving the objectives that these three
actors privately value most and relatively ineffective at achieving other potentially
desirable objectives that are of less private concern to these actors. These ideas are
developed more fully in Part III.
III. WHY REGULATE INTERNATIONAL FINANCE?
This Part argues that, in order to understand IFR, a key distinction must be made
among five different areas of international regulatory cooperation. In each of these
areas, the rise of private international finance creates challenges for national
regulation that states cannot fully address by acting unilaterally. As a result, there is
a potential for states to achieve joint gains through cooperation. However, success
is not purely a function of the existence of potential joint gains. Instead, the
interests and capabilities of the principal political actors of IFR—regulators, large
firms, and great powers—differ across the five areas and explain the substantial
differences in outcomes. The interests of these actors also explain the dominance of
soft law and TRNs in IFR despite their failure to support effective cooperation in
several important areas.
A. The Baseline: Regulatory Unilateralism
What objectives do states pursue in cooperating to regulate international
finance? The usual answer is that financial globalization has undermined the ability
of individual states to regulate effectively. In this view, cooperation is the only way
to manage increasing financial interdependence. By adopting common policies,
states can preserve the effectiveness of national regulation in a globalized world.
This view, however, is incomplete because it neglects the extent to which states
prefer, if at all possible, to act unilaterally. Rather than systematically looking for
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cooperative solutions, they first attempt to address new cross-border challenges by
applying their own laws, even if the relevant activities also have connections to
other states. The question, then, must be recast as follows: What objectives are
states unable to achieve unilaterally, so that they turn to international cooperation?
This starting point is conventional in international relations scholarship. Because
cooperation imposes costs on states in terms of time, resources, and sovereignty,
scholars do not typically assume that states have a propensity for cooperation for its
own sake. Rather, they cooperate to achieve benefits they cannot attain alone. In the
case of IFR, individual states are not defenseless against cross-border finance. They
often can—and do—apply their laws unilaterally to activities that affect their
markets. When this approach is viable, they prefer it. International cooperation
involves extensive negotiations, delays, and compromises. States have to cede
some of their authority and conform their laws to international standards, which
may depart from their preferred approach. These costs can be avoided by regulating
unilaterally. On a normative level, unilateral regulation appeals to the idea of
subsidiarity, according to which collective institutions should perform only those
tasks that cannot be performed effectively at the local level.200
This preference for unilateralism is also supported by the history of IFR. Until
the 1970s, international finance was marginal and regulation was a domestic
concern.201 With the collapse of Bretton Woods, many new cross-border regulatory
challenges emerged. While regulators slowly began to develop cooperation
mechanisms, unilateralism was initially the more salient approach, especially in the
United States. Thus, U.S. courts and the SEC exercise jurisdiction over securities
fraud that has “effects” in the United States, even if the transaction occurred
abroad.202 Until recent reforms, foreign firms with securities traded in the United
States were required to reconcile their financial statements to U.S. GAAP, a costly
and time-consuming process. Many other rules—for securities offerings, brokerdealers, securities exchanges, and tender offers—apply as soon as the activity is,
even in part, directed at the United States. Over time, the SEC has clarified the
territorial scope of these provisions and provided some exemptions—but all of this
was done unilaterally.203 Other examples of unilateralism abound in U.S.
regulation, as well as many other countries.204

200. For instance, subsidiarity is enshrined in the European treaties as a fundamental
principle of the European Union. It also is frequently invoked in debates on global
governance and federalism.
201. See supra Part I.
202. See, e.g., Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 206 (2d Cir.), rev’d on other
grounds, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc). These relevant cases were reversed in
Morrison v. National Australia Bank, 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010), but Congress soon adopted a
provision meant to restore the “conduct or effects” test for SEC enforcement actions. DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, § 929P(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77v(c)
(Supp. IV 2010).
203. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.901–905 (2012) (securities offerings); § 240.13e-4
(tender offers); § 240.15a-6 (broker-dealers).
204. Other examples of unilateral U.S. regulation include strict access requirements and
regulation of foreign bank branches, which are generally prohibited from taking retail
deposits; regulation of foreign insurers by state regulators; and routine prosecution of
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In sum, both theory and history suggest that, in each area of IFR, the starting
point is unilateralism: each state prefers to address cross-border challenges simply
by applying its own laws. As will be seen, however, unilateralism is not always an
effective response. The first step, then, is to identify limitations on what states can
achieve unilaterally. In areas where unilateral action has serious shortcomings,
states may be able to achieve joint gains by cooperating. The second step goes
beyond functionalist analysis by examining how politics—and particularly the
interests of the salient actors identified above—affect outcomes in the relevant area.
In other words, rather than assuming that the outcomes are driven by a rational
calculation of costs and benefits by states, it examines how politics actually support
or undermine beneficial cooperation in each area.
B. Five Objectives of International Regulatory Cooperation
1. Securing Cross-Border Coordination of Enforcement and Supervision
A first limitation of unilateralism is that even if a state attempts to apply its laws
to cross-border financial transactions, it may be difficult to enforce those laws in
practice. When trying to bring a cross-border securities fraud case, regulators may
find that essential evidence or witnesses are abroad, or that local judgments cannot
be enforced in other countries. These practical difficulties can undermine the
effectiveness of unilateral regulation. Likewise, as financial firms become global
and their structure becomes more complex, supervising them internationally
becomes more challenging. Without some coordination and allocation of
responsibility among national authorities, some firms may avoid effective
regulation altogether. This danger was dramatically illustrated by the collapse of
the Bank of Credit and Commerce International, a global bank that circumvented
effective consolidated supervision for years.205
The first collective challenge, then, is to coordinate the actions of national
regulators to close gaps in enforcement and supervision. This objective can often be
achieved through relatively simple agreements on information sharing and mutual
assistance. Much of the first generation of IFR standards—notably the Basel
Concordat and the network of securities MOUs—relate to this type of cooperation.
It has been successful overall, culminating with widespread adoption of the IOSCO
MMOU and a workable regime for cross-border bank supervision under the revised
Concordat. This outcome appears to support the conventional account of IFR.
Regulators perceived a common problem posed by globalization and crafted a
cooperative solution that produces joint gains. The story is not so simple, however,

anticompetitive activities abroad that have effects on U.S. markets. The European Union also
routinely imposes its financial regulations to transnational activities that affect its markets.
One salient example was its adoption in 2002 of a directive requiring all financial
conglomerates active in Europe to be subject to consolidated supervision and capital
requirements, which several major U.S. financial groups lacked at the time. See Parliament
and Council Directive 2002/87/EC, 2003 O.J. (L 35) 1.
205. See RICHARD J. HERRING & ROBERT E. LITAN, FINANCIAL REGULATION IN THE
GLOBAL ECONOMY 103–05 (1995); SEN. JOHN KERRY & SEN. HANK BROWN, THE BCCI
AFFAIR: A REPORT TO THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, U.S. SENATE (1992).
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because there is another crucial ingredient in this success: the interests of the
principal political actors were also aligned in favor of cooperation.
National regulators have many reasons to favor this kind of cooperation. It can
be implemented relatively easily, it enhances their authority, and it does not
compromise their discretion. They are not going beyond their mandate, but
developing more effective ways of enforcing existing laws that might otherwise be
undermined. They usually already have the legal authority to request and provide
assistance; if not, cooperative agreements like the MMOU give them a reason to
ask the legislature for more powers. This may be particularly true of developing
country regulators, whose membership in TRNs reinforces their domestic prestige
and authority over the local financial industry. Finally, regulators have little reason
to fear unanticipated consequences, because these arrangements preserve ample
flexibility to withhold cooperation in individual cases—for instance politically
sensitive ones. The financial industry, for its part, has little to gain and much to lose
by opposing this form of cooperation. While certain firms may lose from more
effective cooperation, it is hard to imagine an industry association lobbying against
cross-border antifraud or insider trading enforcement. There is also empirical
evidence that the largest firms are rarely the targets of formal enforcement by
regulators,206 giving them little reason to fear cooperative arrangements.
Finally, the great powers have a strong interest in promoting this kind of
cooperation because they are the heaviest users of cross-border assistance in
enforcing their laws.207 Thus, the SEC was the driving force behind IOSCO’s early
efforts to expand the network of MOUs.208 Likewise, revisions to the Basel
Concordat were driven by the United States and Europe, concerned about
inadequate home country supervision of banks operating in their markets.209 Most
other countries, for their part, have little reason to resist such cooperation. There
may have been some OFCs whose financial industry attracted customers by
shielding them from onshore enforcement and supervision. In these exceptional
cases, the relevant countries did not cooperate voluntarily and the great powers
attempted to coerce them. For most countries, however, the costs are small.
2. Liberalizing International Finance by Harmonizing Regulatory Requirements
A second problem of unilateralism is that several states concurrently apply
different rules to the same activities. These duplicative and often inconsistent

206. See, e.g., Julie Andersen Hill, Bank Capital Regulation by Enforcement: An
Empirical Study, 87 IND. L.J. 645, 690–93 (2012); Stavros Gadinis, The SEC and the
Financial Industry: Evidence from Enforcement Against Broker-Dealers, 67 BUS. LAW. 679
(2012); Philip A. Wellons, Enforcement of Risk-Based Capital Rules, in CAPITAL ADEQUACY
BEYOND BASEL 284 (Hal S. Scott ed. 2005).
207. The SEC likely remains the heaviest user (and provider) of enforcement assistance.
During its 2010 fiscal year, it made 605 requests to foreign authorities and responded to 457
requests from abroad. Outline: Office of International Affairs, in THE SEC SPEAKS IN 2011
813, 838 (2011).
208. See Chris Brummer, Post-American Securities Regulation, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 327
(2010).
209. See WOOD, supra note 72, at 58–62.
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requirements impose costs and delays on cross-border finance, amounting to de
facto barriers to trade. In some cases, duplication is merely burdensome. Thus,
foreign companies issuing securities in the United States historically had to pay
accountants and lawyers to reconcile their financial statements to U.S. GAAP and
produce U.S. disclosure.210 In other cases, national rules are fundamentally
inconsistent, creating virtually insurmountable barriers. Foreign stock exchanges
cannot place trading screens in the United States because they cannot comply with
both their home country laws and U.S. requirements.211 Likewise, U.S. mutual fund
rules conflict with those of other countries, effectively precluding access by foreign
funds to the U.S. market.212 The corporate governance and auditor oversight
reforms of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act raised fears that some U.S.-listed foreign
companies would be unable to comply without breaking the law in their home
countries.213 In brief, unilateral regulation often imposes burdens on cross-border
finance, and some of these burdens are unnecessary because the national rules have
similar aims.
As a result, an important collective objective that can be achieved through
cooperation is to reduce these barriers. There are numerous explicit liberalization
initiatives in finance, such as eliminating formal capital controls or making market
access commitments under the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).
These initiatives are necessary but not sufficient because they usually leave
regulatory barriers untouched. For instance, many countries have financial services
commitments under the GATS, but retain discretion to regulate in ways that
effectively restrict access. When making GATS commitments, countries often
grandfather their existing regulations; the United States did so for insurance.214
Even without such specific carve-outs, the GATS allows states to “tak[e] measures
for prudential reasons . . . or to ensure the integrity and stability of the financial
system.”215 That provision defines “prudential measures” very broadly and does not
impose a necessity requirement, unlike most other GATS exceptions.216 Therefore,
even in areas where countries have made GATS commitments, domestic regulation
often remains a barrier to cross-border activity. In such areas, regulatory
harmonization is necessary to effectively liberalize cross-border finance.

210. See SCOTT, supra note 62, at 173–74.
211. See Howell E. Jackson, Andreas M. Fleckner & Mark Gurevich, Foreign Trading
Screens in the United States, 1 CAP. MKTS. L.J. 54, 56–61 (2006).
212. See SCOTT, supra note 62, at 915–25.
213. See id. at 81–103, 133.
214. See Brown, supra note 110, at 957, 959–63.
215. General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex on Financial Services, 1869
U.N.T.S.183, at 308.
216. See id. The provision defines “prudential measures” much more broadly than the
common usage of that term to include measures “for the protection of investors, depositors,
policy holders or persons to whom a fiduciary duty is owed by a financial service supplier.”
Id. In addition, many other aspects of the GATS provide flexibility to regulate financial
services. See generally Kern Alexander, The GATS and Financial Services: Liberalisation
and Regulation in Global Financial Markets, in THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION AND
TRADE IN SERVICES 561 (Kern Alexander & Mads Andenas eds., 2008).
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Some of the most important international standards fall in this category. In 1998,
IOSCO adopted a standardized form for nonfinancial disclosure that reduces
transaction costs and delays for international securities offerings.217 Likewise, for
more than a decade, the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) and the
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) have conducted a major effort to
harmonize financial accounting standards.218 This project is driven in large part by
the potential efficiency gains. For instance, the SEC’s acceptance of International
Financial Reporting Standards-based financial statements for foreign issuers
eliminated the need to reconcile their books to U.S. GAAP, which had long been a
major transaction cost of accessing U.S. markets.219 Greater cross-country
comparability of financial statements also leads to greater efficiency in global
financial markets and benefits transnational companies.220 To be sure, these
successes have taken substantial time and effort to come to fruition, and there are
important areas, like mutual funds and insurance, where there is little
harmonization.221 Nevertheless, liberalization is overall an area of relative success
for the current system of IFR. Why?
This is an area where large financial firms and transnational companies have
much to gain, and unsurprisingly, they have played a greater role than in other
areas. As these initiatives reduce regulatory barriers to cross-border finance, they
gain easier and more efficient access to foreign markets and lower capital costs. To
be sure, they might be reluctant to support harmonization efforts that produce
stricter rules, as compliance costs could exceed the benefits of enhanced market
access. However, the international standards produced by such harmonization
initiatives are rarely stricter than existing national standards. For instance, the
IOSCO disclosure form was closely based on the existing U.S. form.222 As a result,
firms that already complied with U.S. rules could now access additional markets at
little additional cost. Therefore, as a rule, large financial firms support international
harmonization in areas like disclosure, customer protection, business conduct, and
the like.223 Mutual recognition agreements, under which countries simply allow
foreign firms that comply with their home country rules to access their markets are
even better—from the perspective of the large financial firms.224

217. See SCOTT, supra note 62, at 172–73.
218. See id. at 181–82.
219. See id. at 175–79.
220. See TIM BÜTHE & WALTER MATTLI, THE NEW GLOBAL RULERS: THE PRIVATIZATION
OF REGULATION IN THE WORLD ECONOMY 4 (2011).
221. On mutual funds, see SCOTT, supra note 62, at 915–25; on insurance, see Brown,
supra note 110.
222. See Verdier, supra note 2, at 150.
223. See, e.g., Edward F. Greene & Omer S. Oztan, The Attack on National Regulation:
Why We Need a Global Framework for Domestic Regulation, 4 CAP. MKTS. L.J. 6 (2009);
Underhill & Zhang, supra note 186.
224. The industry generally supported the SEC’s mutual recognition program, which
came to a halt in 2008. See, e.g., Edward F. Greene, Beyond Borders: Time to Tear Down the
Barriers to Global Investing, 48 HARV. INT’L L.J. 85 (2007). Its support, however, was
somewhat tepid given the limited benefits of the agreement for the largest firms and
institutional investors. See Pierre-Hugues Verdier, Mutual Recognition in International
Finance, 52 HARV. INT’L L.J. 55, 89–90 (2011).
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National regulators are often sympathetic to international harmonization efforts,
as long as the resulting standards are consistent with the aims of preexisting
national rules. From their perspective, more uniform rules and enhanced access
expand the markets under their oversight, facilitate cross-border enforcement
cooperation, and satisfy the most powerful industry constituencies. There may be
resistance by smaller, domestically oriented firms that benefit from the existence of
regulatory barriers to foreign entry. In some cases, consumers may also resist
harmonization of customer protection rules and other areas that affect them. The
influence of import-competing firms and consumers probably varies and might
explain the relative lack of harmonization in areas that are consumer oriented and
have many smaller firms, such as mutual funds and insurance.225 Despite such
resistance, regulatory liberalization may be self-reinforcing, as it allows the largest
firms to expand, gaining more political clout.
Finally, the great powers have reasons to favor such harmonization efforts.
Given the inherent attractiveness of their markets and the greater resources and
prestige of their regulators, they are in a strong position to shape the international
standards. By developing standards that are as close as possible to their existing
laws, they can minimize their own adjustment costs and accrue a greater share of
the benefits of liberalization. Thus, the SEC was instrumental in promoting and
developing the IOSCO nonfinancial disclosure form, and the outcome was virtually
identical to existing SEC rules. Likewise, although IFRS are poised to supplant
U.S. GAAP, the FASB played a major role in developing the global standards, so
they are often close to U.S. standards, particularly on controversial issues like
mark-to-market accounting.226 Moreover, most of the large firms that benefit from
harmonization are based in the great powers.
As a result of this coincidence of interests, this is an area where the strengths of
soft law and TRNs are most in evidence. Their monitoring and enforcement
limitations are not major obstacles to success, since markets often create incentives
for firms and governments to adopt and comply with international standards. In this
area, private standard setting is also very important.227 Besides the role of IASB in
accounting, market associations such as ISDA, SIFMA and the International
Chamber of Commerce also develop standardized documentation, provide dispute
resolution procedures, and even draft model statutes for adoption by national
legislatures.228 Together, they have developed much of the international legal
framework for financial derivatives, repurchase agreements, securities lending, and
trade finance.

225. Other explanations have been suggested, such as the fragmentation of U.S.
insurance regulators, which makes negotiation of international standards more difficult. See,
e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: A NEW FOUNDATION
39–40 (2009).
226. See BÜTHE & MATTLI, supra note 220, at 99–125.
227. See DREZNER, supra note 94, at 73.
228. See PORTER, supra note 64, at 103–13; Janet Koven Levit, Bottom-Up International
Lawmaking: Reflections on the New Haven School of International Law, 32 YALE J. INT’L L.
393, 133–44 (2007); for SIFMA see Standard Forms and Documentation, SEC. INDUS. &
FIN. MKTS. ASS’N, https://www.sifma.org/services/standard-forms-and-documentation/.
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In a recent review of the literature on private standard setting, Tim Büthe
helpfully synthesizes its major findings.229 First, he asks why private actors supply
standards that amount to public goods and finds that “the supply of private
regulation virtually never occurs unless it also brings private political-economic
benefits to the suppliers.”230 Second, he asks why the targets of the private
standards comply, and finds that except when governments enforce the standards,
compliance must rely on private economic and sociopolitical incentives.231 These
incentives are more likely to succeed where the standard addresses a coordination
problem;232 but when the standard attempts to make the targets provide a public
good or avoid negative externalities, compliance problems arise.233 Büthe
concludes that “private monitoring and enforcement can fully compensate for this
weakness of private regulation only under ideal conditions, including sustained
vigilant attention by altruistically motivated volunteers and the absence of
collective action problems, which rarely if ever hold.”234
In light of these considerations, the success of private standards in areas where
the objective of IFR is harmonization is unsurprising. The “public good” nature of
the standards does not inhibit private actors from providing them because their cost
is negligible relative to the size of global financial markets and the potential private
gains. IASB’s 2009 budget was a mere $30 million—80% of which came from
fundraising, mostly from large companies and accounting firms.235 Firms that
contribute to IASB and ISDA very likely derive more private benefits from
increased efficiency and growth of cross-border markets than they spend.236 They
also benefit from being involved in the standard-setting process.237 Enforcing these
standards is not a problem, because there are market incentives to comply and
because governments often incorporate the standards into national regulation.

229. See generally Tim Büthe, Global Private Politics: A Research Agenda, 12 BUS. &
POL., no. 3, Art. 12, 2010 [hereinafter Büthe, Global Private Politics]; Tim Büthe, Private
Regulation in the Global Economy: A (P)Review, 12 BUS. & POL., no. 3, Art. 2, 2010
[hereinafter Büthe, Private Regulation in the Global Economy].
230. Büthe, Global Private Politics, supra note 229, at 6.
231. Id. at 9–10. On those incentives, see also Büthe, Private Regulation in the Global
Economy, supra note 229, at 15–20.
232. For a theory of coordination standards, see BÜTHE & MATTLI, supra note 220.
233. On that distinction, see Verdier, supra note 2, at 122–26.
234. Büthe, Global Private Politics, supra note 229, at 17.
235. See BÜTHE & MATTLI, supra note 220, at 74–75.
236. On the benefits for internationally oriented firms and multinationals, see id. at 65–
66.
237. Thus, Büthe and Mattli point out that these firms’ support to IASB likely allows
them to influence the standard-setting process. See id. at 65–66, 74 n. 56. Likewise, the
largest derivatives dealers were instrumental in creating and supporting ISDA and are
closely involved in developing new forms and standards. See Sean M. Flanagan, The Rise of
a Trade Association: Group Interactions Within the International Swaps and Derivatives
Association, 6 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 211, 234–53 (2001).
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3. Compelling States to Improve Their Financial Regulation
A third problem of unilateralism is that without international standards certain
countries may maintain an inadequate level of regulation. In such cases, the goal of
cooperation will be to ensure that all countries observe minimum standards that
may require enhancing their existing laws and enforcement if needed. This
statement raises two fundamental questions: why would some countries have
inadequate regulation, and why would others care? Many countries have weak
regulation because their financial markets are undeveloped. In some cases, they
may now be reaching a stage where overhauling them is important to sustain their
economic development. But these countries have incentives to improve regulation.
They need no compulsion. They may use international standards as a model, but
they might also use the laws of leading countries, or hire experts to develop new
laws.238 Other countries also have limited incentives to assist—let alone compel—
them to improve their laws. After all, financial regulation has historically been a
domestic concern, which suggests that countries had little reason to care about each
other’s laws. To explain why some states might maintain inadequate regulation and
others might want them to improve it, one must posit externalities.
The hypothesis, then, is that some countries have incentives to maintain
inefficiently low standards because the costs are borne by others. The latter, in turn,
want the former to internalize those costs by improving their regulation. While one
could imagine numerous potential externalities, two concerns have historically
been important. The first is that ineffective regulation in developing countries and
LDCs increases the likelihood of financial crises, imposing costs on others in the
form of financial assistance and potential contagion. These countries, the theory
goes, will not willingly improve their standards because some of the costs are
externalized and because powerful domestic constituencies benefit from the status
quo. Thus, Drezner argues that elites in LDCs benefit from poorly regulated
financial systems that they can manipulate for patronage, and Walter argues that
businessmen tied to political leaders oppose reforms that would reduce their control
over the financial sector.239 This concern motivated the post-Asia reform agenda.
The second concern is that some countries may use lax regulation to attract
business to their financial industry, while externalizing the costs. For instance, an
OFC could turn a blind eye to money laundering and tax evasion by drug cartels
from a neighboring country, thus benefitting from their business while the costs of
criminality are borne by its neighbor. This concern—justified or not—motivated
the campaign against OFCs.
The experience of those two campaigns indicates that enhancing regulation in
countries where influential political actors resist reform is exceedingly difficult.
Once again, the political factors are crucial; but this time, they point in different
directions. The great powers are clearly the driving force behind these efforts, but
their interests are conflicted. On the one hand, their globalized economies are

238. On various transnational diffusion mechanisms that may affect the adoption by
states of domestic policies that have limited direct repercussions on other states, see
KATERINA LINOS, THE DEMOCRATIC FOUNDATIONS OF POLICY DIFFUSION (2013).
239. See DREZNER, supra note 94, at 128; WALTER, supra note 130, at 36–39.
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vulnerable to economic shocks worldwide, and they are major contributors to the
IMF and World Bank, so they wish to reduce the risk of financial crises and
contagion. On the other hand, they prefer to keep standard setting in specialized,
informal bodies such as TRNs in which they have more influence, rather than in
formal IOs with more formal processes and voting rules. The problem is that TRNs
lack the authority and capacity to monitor or enforce the standards. The solution
was, in one case, to delegate standard setting to TRNs and pressure the IFIs to
enforce them; in the other, the solution was to use a club organization, the FATF, to
apply pressure on OFCs through blacklisting and sanctions.240
Can such external pressures overcome political resistance in the targeted
countries? Walter’s study indicates, at least in East Asia, the answer was largely
negative.241 These countries, with the exception of Malaysia, formally adopted
extensive regulatory reforms as a condition of financial assistance.242 Walter,
however, distinguishes such formal compliance from substantive compliance. The
latter can fail at three different stages: the government can adopt a policy of
regulatory forbearance, the bureaucracy can obstruct implementation through weak
enforcement, and firms can disobey the rules in ways the government is unable to
sanction effectively.243 The key to Walter’s argument is that external actors, such as
the IFIs and market participants, are often neither willing nor able to secure
substantive compliance.244 The IMF, for instance, was a reluctant partner in the
Asian reform effort: its mandate to oversee domestic regulation was contested; it
had to answer to all its members, not just the great powers; and it had strong
incentives not to declare a borrower in breach.245 Even if they had the right
incentives, IFIs are poorly situated to verify substantive compliance. Measuring the
quality of compliance is difficult as the information is not transparent, the relevant
parties have incentives to conceal it, and the IFIs have limited capacity to uncover
information independently. As a result, the IMF was severely criticized for its lack
of expertise, its “check-the-box” approach to implementation, and its ignorance of
domestic conditions.246

240. See DREZNER, supra note 94, at 139–45; Verdier, supra note 2, at 147–49.
241. See WALTER, supra note 130, at 166–69.
242. See id. at 1–5. Malaysia was not formally subject to IMF intervention and
conditionality. Id. at 99.
243. See id. at 30–32.
244. See id. at 39–41.
245. See Marcel Fratzscher & Julien Reynaud, IMF Surveillance and Financial
Markets—A Political Economy Analysis, 27 EUR. J. POL. ECON. 405 (2011) (finding
empirical evidence that IMF surveillance is more favorable for countries with large
outstanding IMF loans).
246. See, e.g., INT’L MONETARY FUND INDEP. EVALUATION OFFICE, REPORT ON THE
EVALUATION OF THE FINANCIAL SECTOR ASSESSMENT PROGRAM (2006); Cally Jordan, The
Dangerous Illusion of International Financial Standards and the Legacy of the Financial
Stability Forum, 12 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 333, 350–58 (2011). Despite their limitations,
FSAP evaluations of domestic securities regulation showed “persistent weaknesses in a
number of countries and . . . an urgent need for improvement,” often due to weak
enforcement, lack of skilled personnel, and insufficient independence of regulators. See Ana
Carvajal & Jennifer Elliott, Strengths and Weaknesses in Securities Market Regulation: A
Global Analysis 5 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 259, 2007).
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The outcome was “mock compliance”—East Asian countries formally adopted
the standards while ignoring them in practice, particularly when powerful domestic
actors were concerned.247 Walter provides multiple examples of this “hidden
compliance gap”: newly “independent” banking regulators were in fact tightly
controlled by politicians, accounting manipulation and regulatory forbearance
allowed banks to circumvent new capital adequacy standards, and regulators
ignored violations of loan concentration and insider lending rules.248 In corporate
governance, the situation was even worse, as Indonesian political cronies and
Korean chaebols fiercely resisted loosening their grip on companies.249 The IFIs
did little more than gently flag the lapses they identified, often in confidential
reports.250 The markets also were not privy to information that would have allowed
them to assess substantive compliance. In any event, they had little incentive to do
so, since they expected that governments would effectively guarantee loans to
important or politically connected banks. Likewise, the diffusion of Western proreform ideas proved a double-edged sword as resisters, who often controlled the
media, denounced the standards as neocolonial impositions.251 In sum, efforts to
use IFR standards to compel unwilling states to improve their regulation raise great
difficulties and, in the most salient cases, appear to have been relatively
unsuccessful.252
4. Securing Collective Action to Raise Prudential Standards
A fourth limitation of unilateralism is that a country may wish to raise its
prudential standards for financial firms—for instance, in response to a banking
crisis—but be unable to do so unilaterally because it would place its industry at a
competitive disadvantage. This situation is unlike the one described above, where
some states would gain and others lose from the adoption of higher regulatory
standards. Here, even if every state believes higher standards are desirable, it
cannot act unilaterally without sacrificing its own competitiveness. Moreover, this
problem persists over time. Even if several countries did agree to raise their
standards, individual members of this pact would eventually face incentives to
relax their standards in order to gain a competitive advantage. In other words,
international efforts to raise prudential standards involve a prisoner’s dilemma. The
challenge is to secure widespread adherence and compliance by participants who
face constant temptation to defect and free ride on the efforts of others.

247. WALTER, supra note 130, at 166–77.
248. See id. at 56–70, 102–09, 130–42.
249. See id. at 71–72, 142–50.
250. See id. at 177.
251. See id. at 95, 150.
252. This is consistent with empirical work indicating that the benefits of implementing
IFR standards depend on the preexisting quality of a country’s regulatory system. See Ali
Burak Güven, The Feasibility of IFI-Led Institutional Reform: Four Turkish Experiments
Compared, 30 DEV. POL’Y REV. 425, 427 (2012); Hans B. Christensen, Luzi Hail &
Christian Leuz, Capital-Market Effects of Securities Regulation: Hysteresis, Implementation,
and Enforcement 7 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16737, 2011).
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The primary obstacle to such an effort is domestic politics. Banks and other
financial firms resist the imposition of stronger prudential regulation. The reason is
simple: they have incentives to incur more leverage and take more risk than is
socially optimal, and regulation prevents them from doing so. For instance, thinner
capitalization makes a bank more profitable, but it also makes it more vulnerable to
failure. In a world where bank owners and managers internalized the full costs of
failure, they would have incentives to balance these considerations when deciding
how much capital to maintain. However, many of these costs are externalized.
Shareholders cannot lose more than their investment. Additional losses are borne
by government (through emergency loans, deposit insurance, and outright bailouts)
and other firms (through contagion and higher deposit insurance rates). In other
words, the economic rationale for mandatory capital requirements is that they force
banks to internalize the social costs of risk-taking. From the perspective of the
individual bank and its shareholders, however, such requirements constitute a
private cost without a corresponding private benefit. Therefore, they have strong
incentives to resist or avoid them.253
In light of this rationale, the argument that market forces promote adherence and
compliance with capital requirements requires reexamination. As seen above, this
argument is very widespread in the political science literature on IFR.254
Nevertheless, its logic is questionable. Since high leverage makes financial firms
more profitable, shareholders will want more of it than is socially optimal.
Creditors and depositors would normally have incentives to limit leverage, but this
discipline is blunted by the existence of deposit insurance and, for many banks and
large firms, a government safety net that protects even uninsured creditors. To put
the point starkly: if the market already imposed adequate leverage constraints on
financial firms, there would be no need for capital regulation in the first place; by
the same token, if one accepts the logic for such regulation, one cannot expect the
market to enforce it. The hypothesis that the market will enforce capital standards is
inconsistent with the economic rationale for their existence. The same point applies
generally to all prudential rules that compel financial firms to minimize risk-taking
and internalize social costs, like lending concentration limits, limits on affiliate
transactions, or prohibitions of risky activities like proprietary trading.255
The empirical evidence, limited as it is, is also inconsistent with the view that
markets effectively enforce prudential rules. Before the subprime crisis, U.S.
commercial banks were subject to comprehensive capital rules, including an overall
leverage limit, while the largest investment banks such as Bear Stearns and Lehman
Brothers had to comply with a looser SEC regime based on Basel II, without a
leverage limit.256 As a result, these investment banks were substantially more
leveraged, more profitable—and more fragile. They all failed, merged, or were
rescued by government during the crisis. The credit rating agencies, for their part,
do not follow Basel but rather follow their own assessments of “appropriate”

253. See SINGER, supra note 71, at 19.
254. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
255. See Eichengreen, supra note 3, at 13 & n.29.
256. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, SEC’S OVERSIGHT
OF BEAR STEARNS AND RELATED ENTITIES: THE CONSOLIDATED SUPERVISED ENTITY
PROGRAM 2–4, 10–20 (2008).
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capital levels for banks.257 In some cases, CRA ratings reflect the likelihood that a
bank will be bailed out—thus giving it a better rating than its capital position would
otherwise justify.258 To the extent that CRAs and investors take into account breach
by a firm of capital rules, it is out of concern that it will be subject to enforcement
action; but of course, this form of market discipline is entirely derivative of
government enforcement.259 Even if market participants had adequate incentives to
monitor leverage, it is doubtful they could detect outright manipulation like
Lehman’s “Repo 105.”260
An alternative form of the argument may be that markets push countries—rather
than individual firms—to adopt international standards. Indeed, authors often point
to the widespread adoption of Basel I outside the G-10 as evidence of beneficial
market pressure.261 This argument, however, fails to distinguish between formal
and substantive compliance. As Walter’s study makes clear, market participants
cannot assess the latter since they are not privy to the relevant information, such as
the quality of domestic supervision and loan classifications.262 Indeed, they may not
even care about substantive compliance, for several reasons: systemically important
or politically well-connected firms often benefit from an implicit government
guarantee; formal compliance may be sufficient because “national authorities
almost always effectively guarantee the liabilities of formally compliant banks;”263
and their compliance concerns may be swamped by market trends such as the
“global search for yield.”264 In any event, market pressures to comply with
international standards undoubtedly have less influence on advanced economies,
whose attractiveness does not turn on such seals of approval.265 In sum, market
pressures likely play only a limited role in securing adhesion and compliance with
international prudential standards. For the same reasons, private standard setting is
negligible in this area.

257. In its credit rating methodology, Moody’s expressly states that it “sees no automatic
correlation between a bank’s level of regulatory capital and its credit ratings.” Chey, supra
note 133, at 300 (quoting SAMUEL S. THEODORE, MOODY’S INVESTORS SERVICE, RATING
METHODOLOGY 36 (1999)).
258. See Does the Dodd-Frank Act End “Too Big to Fail?”: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Fin. Inst. and Consumer Credit of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 112th Cong.
97 (2011) (statement of Christy Romero, Acting Special Inspector General, Troubled Asset
Relief Program).
259. See WALTER, supra note 130, at 175; Chey, supra note 133, at 298.
260. On the “Repo 105” transactions, see Report of Anton R. Valukas, Examiner at 7321053, In re Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., No. 08-13555 (Bankr. S.D.NY. Mar. 11, 2010),
available at http://jenner.com/lehman/. Lehman was a public firm and was rated, but was not
subject to full bank capital rules. On the difficulty of detecting “accounting games,” see Erik
F. Gerding, The Shadow Banking System and Its Legal Origins 37–39 (Aug. 23, 2011)
(unpublished working paper), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1990816.
261. See, e.g., SINGER, supra note 71, at 123; Simmons, supra note 133, at 601–05.
262. WALTER, supra note 130, at 174–75.
263. Id. at 175 (emphasis in original).
264. Id.
265. See, e.g., Kentaro Tamura, Challenges to Japanese Compliance with the Basel
Capital Accord, 33 JAPANESE ECON., Spring 2005, at 23, 43–44.
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Therefore, the primary force behind such prudential standards must be public,
not private. Until the financial crisis, great power governments had little
involvement with such rules, largely delegating the task to specialized regulators
acting in TRNs such as the Basel Committee. The regulators, however, have
complex incentives. After a crisis, they often are under considerable pressure from
politicians and the public to adopt more stringent prudential rules. However, they
must also consider the impact on their financial industry. As seen above, imposing
stricter prudential standards unilaterally would undermine its competitiveness and
produce a political backlash. The solution, when possible, is to cooperate with their
counterparts abroad to adopt common standards. Thus, Singer argues that, in the
late 1980s, the United States and United Kingdom faced simultaneous shocks to
their banking industries as a result of losses caused by the Latin American debt
crisis, thus creating legislative demand for higher standards. Unable to raise their
standards unilaterally without undermining the competitiveness of their banks, they
successfully pushed for the 1988 Basel Accord.266
As it turns out, however, Basel is highly exceptional. By contrast, IOSCO failed
to create international capital standards for securities firms in the early 1990s,
because only the United Kingdom was facing a crisis and supported the effort while
the United States and Japan were indifferent or hostile.267 For its part, IAIS did not
even attempt to develop international capital rules for insurers until the 2000s.268
Together, Singer’s case studies suggest that uniform international prudential
standards only succeed when several major jurisdictions face similar crises at the
same time and are willing and able to compel others to join. Indeed, Basel remains
the only major international prudential standard with quantitative objectives and a
precise implementation timeline.
In sum, regulators rarely have both the incentives and the capacity to act
collectively to strengthen prudential standards. This situation has several
implications. First, the system is highly selective in choosing areas to address. In
the absence of nearly simultaneous crises in major jurisdictions, coordinated
adoption of stricter standards is unlikely to occur. Second, this is an area where
quantity should not be equated with significance. Since agreement is difficult to
reach, numerous “codes of conduct” and “best practices”—particularly those
adopted by IOSCO—tend to be phrased at a high level of generality, lay out
multiple options reflecting existing national practices, and lack implementation
timelines.269 Third, as crises recede and prosperity returns, the domestic political
balance shifts back towards competitiveness. In other words, crises cause the
regulators’ long-term interest in financial stability and short-term interest in
satisfying political pressures to converge, but soon they start diverging again.270

266. See GOODHART, supra note 72, at 167–81; SINGER, supra note 71, at 21, 32.
267. See SINGER, supra note 71, at 68–69. Singer suggests that such an accord might have
been desirable. See id. at 71–72 The failure (or near failure) of several highly leveraged U.S.
securities firms in 2008 (Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers and Merrill Lynch) suggests as
much.
268. See id. at 111.
269. See PORTER, supra note 64, at 82.
270. BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 58, at 133. Even in the aftermath of a crisis,
pressures to promote economic recovery may preempt efforts to strengthen prudential
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International prudential standards, which are nonbinding and lack effective
enforcement, become vulnerable as regulators begin to cede to domestic pressures.
This, in turn, creates pressure on other regulators to relax the standards as well.
This relaxation can take several forms. The first is noncompliance: national
regulators have many ways to allow their firms to avoid complying with the letter
or spirit of the international standard. In some cases, noncompliance is overt, as
illustrated by the fate of the Basel Accord in the 1990s and 2000s. As the banking
crises in the United States and United Kingdom subsided, Japan faced its own
prolonged downturn. By the mid-1990s, peer regulators knew that Japanese
regulators allowed their banks to massively overestimate their capital, which was in
fact well below Basel requirements.271 They likely were willing to tolerate this
situation to allow Japanese banks to “grow out” of the crisis, and because they were
no longer an important competitive threat. During that period, regulators also
repeatedly ceded to industry pressure to allow dubious instruments to be counted as
regulatory capital.272 Thus, Germany’s admission of some preferred stock was
contrary to the Accord, but other regulators could not compel Germany to comply,
and by that time their own domestic politics also favored relaxation of Basel.273
Even when peer regulators care about compliance, however, it is nearly
impossible to monitor and enforce with the tools available in the current IFR
system. A country may remain in formal compliance—that is, its laws and
regulations might follow international standards—while allowing widespread
substantive noncompliance by its firms. This problem is aggravated by the fact that,
to be effective, financial regulation requires constant and vigilant supervision and
enforcement.274 A national regulator under political pressure to relax regulation
does not have to change the rules; it can quietly instruct examiners to be less
zealous, reduce supervision and enforcement resources, or commit “sins of
omission” by failing to exercise authority it possesses.275 This relaxation can also
happen incrementally through highly technical agency interpretations. Thus, in the
1990s and 2000s, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and Federal
Reserve gradually allowed U.S. banks to expand their subprime mortgage and overthe-counter (OTC) derivatives activities through numerous, obscure regulatory

regulation. Tamura, supra note 265, at 44–45. In the United States, there is ample anecdotal
evidence of pressure from the financial industry to relax many proposed rules implementing
the Dodd-Frank Act. See, e.g., Ben Protess, Wall Street Lobbyist Aims to ‘Reform the
Reform,’ N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (July 14, 2011, 11:06 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/
2011/07/14/wall-street-lobbyists-try-to-reform-the-reform/.
271. See Verdier, supra note 2, at 138.
272. Id. at 137–39.
273. See id. at 138.
274. The literature on IFR has only recently begun to take seriously the problem involved
in implementation and enforcement of standards and to attempt to develop adequate
quantitative measures. See generally Carvajal & Elliott, supra note 246; John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Law and the Market: The Impact of Enforcement, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 229 (2007); Howell E.
Jackson & Mark J. Roe, Public and Private Enforcement of Securities Laws: ResourceBased Evidence, 93 J. FIN. ECON. 207 (2009). Recent empirical research confirms that “the
success of regulation depends critically on how regulation is implemented and enforced and
not just on how it is designed.” Christensen et al., supra note 252, at 36.
275. See Gerding, supra note 260, at 44.
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rulings.276 The cumulative implications of these small steps are hard to detect and
understand even for domestic regulators, let alone for foreign observers.
The second form of relaxation is that, over time, the TRNs themselves may
simply modify the standards to reduce the burden on financial firms. This may even
happen without any formal amendment of the standards if regulators, anticipating
that domestic politics will shift over time, built flexibility into the initial agreement.
For instance, Basel I gave national regulators substantial discretion to adjust their
definition of regulatory capital, so many of the relaxations demanded by banks
could be granted without breaching the Accord.277 Eventually, this flexibility was
insufficient and regulators embarked upon a major reform effort. Basel II, in the
end, substantially expanded national discretion. It is far more complex than Basel I,
and contains numerous areas where regulators may choose among various options.
It also gives them enormous discretion in assessing the adequacy of their banks’
internal risk measurement systems. Unsurprisingly, Basel II was strongly supported
by the largest international banks, in the expectation that it would allow them to
reduce their capital levels.278 In sum, even in the exceptional cases where
international prudential standards are adopted, they are vulnerable to changes in
domestic politics, various forms of noncompliance, and modification by national
regulators.
5. Making Credible Commitments to Overcome Time Inconsistency Problems
Finally, a fifth problem of unilateralism is that uncoordinated, self-interested
actions by individual states can lead to inefficient outcomes. To avoid such
situations, states may agree in advance to ensure they will cooperate to achieve a
more efficient outcome. However, one obstacle to such agreements is the time
inconsistency problem. It arises when an actor wishes to commit to a certain course
of action, but the actor’s preferences have shifted when the time comes to
implement it. This shift, if anticipated by others, makes it impossible for the actor
to credibly commit ex ante, and therefore precludes cooperation. A classic example
relates to monetary policy. In the long term, a government may prefer to commit to
a low-inflation policy; but when actual decisions on interest rates have to be made,
it is likely to be swayed by short-term political considerations. Market participants,
in turn, know that the government’s promise is not credible; they will anticipate
higher inflation and make decisions accordingly, therefore negating the benefits of
the low-inflation policy. This problem can sometimes be solved by creating
mechanisms that allow actors to credibly bind themselves.279 Thus, many countries

276. See Saule T. Omarova, From Gramm-Leach-Bliley to Dodd-Frank: The Unfulfilled
Promise of Section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1683 (2011); Saule T.
Omarova, The Quiet Metamorphosis: How Derivatives Changed the “Business of Banking,”
63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1041 (2009).
277. See Verdier, supra note 2, at 138.
278. See TARULLO, supra note 2, at 101; Underhill & Zhang, supra note 186, at 546.
279. See, e.g., Kenneth A. Shepsle, Discretion, Institutions, and the Problem of
Government Commitment, in SOCIAL THEORY FOR A CHANGING SOCIETY 245 (Pierre
Bourdieu & James S. Coleman eds., 1991); Douglass C. North, Institutions and Credible
Commitment, 149 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 11 (1993); Pierson, supra note
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have established independent central banks with a mandate to maintain price
stability.
Time inconsistency problems also arise in IFR. One manifestation, as seen
above, relates to compliance with international prudential standards. Since there is
no reliable mechanism to enforce the standards, they are vulnerable to opportunistic
defection. Another manifestation of the time inconsistency problem is that some
desirable standards may never be adopted because regulators cannot credibly
commit to following them in the future. This may be the case for cross-border bank
insolvency. Fundamentally, the coordination of bank insolvencies can follow either
universality or territoriality. Under a universal system, a single jurisdiction—say,
that of the bank’s home office—conducts consolidated proceedings. Other
jurisdictions defer to the home state’s decisions and turn over the bank’s assets in
their territory. The home state authority marshals the assets and distributes them to
the bank’s creditors worldwide. Under a territorial system, each jurisdiction where
the bank has operations or assets conducts separate proceedings. Its authorities
gather the local assets of the bank and use them to pay local creditors.280 They may
then turn over any surplus to other jurisdictions. As a result, despite the fact that the
bank is a single legal entity, creditors in different countries will recover more or
less, depending on where its assets and liabilities were at the time of insolvency.
Most commentators argue that, ex ante, it would be more efficient for all states
involved to agree to a universal system, along with arrangements to share the
public costs of resolution among the relevant jurisdictions.281 Nevertheless, most
states apply a territorial approach,282 and very little progress has been made on
proposals to create a universal system.283 As the Governor of the Bank of England
famously stated, “global banks are global in life but national in death.”284 Why?
Here too, is a time inconsistency problem. Even if a universal system were in place,
some states would have strong incentives to defect ex post, when a bank actually
fails. This is because at the time of failure, some states will be revealed to hold
more assets relative to local liabilities than others. If they turn over these assets to
the universal proceeding, local creditors will recover less. At this point, there will
be enormous political pressure from local creditors, often including the government
itself, to refuse to comply with the universal system. As three U.S. banking officials
126, at 480.
280. See Thomas C. Baxter, Jr., Joyce M. Hansen, & Joseph H. Sommer, Two Cheers for
Territoriality: An Essay on International Bank Insolvency Law, 78 AM. BANKR. L.J. 57, 60–
62 (2004).
281. See, e.g., STIJN CLAESSENS, RICHARD J. HERRING, & DIRK SCHOENMAKER, A SAFER
WORLD FINANCIAL SYSTEM: IMPROVING THE RESOLUTION OF SYSTEMIC INSTITUTIONS 85–87
(2010); JONATHAN FIECHTER, İNCI ÖTKER-ROBE, ANNA ILLYINA, MICHAEL HSU, ANDRÉ
SANTOS, & JAY SURTI, SUBSIDIARIES OR BRANCHES: DOES ONE SIZE FIT ALL? 18 (IMF Staff
Discussion Paper 2011). But see Baxter et al, supra note 280, at 88.
282. CROSS-BORDER BANK INSOLVENCY 170 (Rosa M. Lastra ed., 2011).
283. The European Union has adopted a universal resolution system, but it only applies
within the Union. See Georgina Peters, Developments in the EU, in CROSS-BORDER BANK
INSOLVENCY, supra note 282, at 128.
284. Adair Turner, Chairman, FSA, Turner Review Press Conference: Speaking Notes
and Slides for the Press (Mar. 18, 2009), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Library/
Communication/Speeches/2009/0318_at.shtml (quoting Bank of England Governor Mervyn
King).
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wrote, “when times are rough, [supervisors] will think like administrative officials,
rather than judges. They will grab whatever they can.”285 These incentives make
agreement on a universal resolution system virtually impossible ex ante because
regulators will not believe each other’s promise to turn assets over to foreign
proceedings or abide by burden-sharing agreements.
As a result, the territorial system, though inefficient, has not been surmounted
by non-binding international standards. Instead, territoriality has become more
entrenched. The United States applies a “ring-fencing” approach to U.S. branches
of foreign banks, under which not only the assets of the branch, but even assets in
the United States owned by the home office, are allocated first to the U.S. branch’s
creditors.286 The European Union, for its part, has adopted a universal system for
banks headquartered in one member state with branches in others, but it does not
apply to non-EU banks.287 Moreover, host states often require foreign banks to
establish pledge accounts or maintain minimum assets in their jurisdiction, impose
restrictions on transactions with foreign branches or affiliates, and decline to
recognize claims arising from such transactions.288 These requirements are meant to
ensure that there will be local assets to compensate local creditors.
These rules create inefficiency in global banking: by making recovery
dependent on where the transaction was “booked,” where assets are located at the
time of insolvency, and what the priority rules are in each jurisdiction, they
increase the cost of credit for banks. The United States also prohibits branches of
foreign banks from taking retail deposits, requiring separately capitalized U.S.
subsidiaries for this purpose.289 This type of local capitalization requirement
impairs efficient cross-border capital allocation by international banks through
branching.290 Beyond these economic costs, the absence of agreement on crossborder resolution also undermines coordinated cross-border supervision by
dissociating supervisory responsibility from financial responsibility. As a bank
approaches insolvency, the problems worsen. Host supervisors may require banks
to move additional capital to their jurisdiction, leading to conflict with the home
state.291 They may also trigger insolvency proceedings too quickly, fearing that

285. Baxter et al., supra note 280, at 88; see also BASEL COMM. ON BANKING
SUPERVISION, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE CROSS-BORDER BANK RESOLUTION
GROUP 4 (2010) [hereinafter BCBS REPORT].
286. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 3102(j) (2006) (federal branches of foreign banks).
287. For those non-EU banks, individual member states are free to follow a territorial
procedure. See CROSS-BORDER BANK INSOLVENCY, supra note 282, at 168.
288. See BCBS REPORT, supra note 285, at 16; BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION,
THE INSOLVENCY LIQUIDATION OF A MULTINATIONAL BANK 8–9 (1992) [hereinafter BCBS,
INSOLVENCY LIQUIDATION]; Eva Hüpkes & Diego Devos, Cross-Border Bank Resolution: A
Reform Agenda, in INTERNATIONAL MONETARY AND FINANCIAL LAW 359 (Mario Giovanoli
& Diego Devos eds., 2010).
289. See 12 U.S.C. § 3104(d) (2006).
290. See Richard J. Herring, Conflicts Between Home & Host Country Prudential
Supervisors, in INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTABILITY: GLOBAL BANKING AND NATIONAL
REGULATION 201, 203–04 (Douglas D. Evanoff, George G. Kaufman & John R. LaBrosse
eds., 2007).
291. See FIN. SERVS. AUTH., THE TURNER REVIEW: A REGULATORY RESPONSE TO THE
GLOBAL BANKING CRISIS 99 (2009).
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assets will leave their jurisdiction.292 Once the bank is insolvent, rival resolution
proceedings may compete with each other to access assets in third countries,
increasing transaction costs and reducing total recovery.293
Attempts to agree on other aspects of burden-sharing for financial firms have
also failed. Early in the history of the Basel Committee, some participants argued
that the Concordat should explicitly allocate the responsibility to act as lender of
last resort for international banks.294 The Committee could not agree, leaving
“calculated vagueness surrounding official arrangements to deal with an
international banking crisis.”295 Likewise, international standards never addressed
the allocation of responsibility between the home and host state for insuring
deposits held in foreign branches, leaving the outcome to be decided by national
authorities. Sometimes they protect foreign deposits, sometimes not. Often, the
decision is made on a case-by-case basis and is influenced by political
considerations. Thus, Iceland initially declined to indemnify foreign depositors
when its banks collapsed.296 Host countries, for their part, act unilaterally by
requiring foreign bank branches to join their own insurance regimes or set up
separate subsidiaries to take retail deposits.297 In sum, because regulators cannot
credibly commit themselves to comply with ex ante arrangements under the current
informal IFR system, they instead take less efficient and potentially
counterproductive unilateral actions.
If states could achieve joint gains through credible ex ante commitments, why
do they not create stronger mechanisms to enforce such commitments? Once again,

292. See BCBS, INSOLVENCY LIQUIDATION, supra 288, at 9.
293. See id. at 13–14.
294. See GOODHART, supra note 72, at 35–40.
295. Jack Guttentag & Richard Herring, The Lender of Last Resort Function in an
International Context 28 (The Wharton School, Working Paper No. 9-81, 1983). The G-10
central bankers had previously released a communiqué aimed at reassuring markets by
stating that “means are available for that purpose and will be used if and when necessary.”
Id. (quoting Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Press Communiqué of Sept. 10,
1974); see also HELLEINER, supra note 18, at 173. There were some reports that the central
bankers had confidentially agreed to a more detailed allocation of responsibility, but this was
never confirmed, and major central banks strongly resisted the idea. See KAPSTEIN, supra
note 70, at 42–43; Guttentag & Herring, supra, at 28–32. When Banco Ambrosiano failed in
1982, the Bank of Italy did not consider itself bound to provide lender-of-last-resort facilities
to a foreign subsidiary conducting Euromarkets operations. The Chairman of the Basel
Committee supported that position, stating that the Concordat related “to supervisory
responsibilities, not lender of last resort responsibilities.” KAPSTEIN, supra note 70, at 54
(emphasis omitted). The 1983 Concordat clarified this point by explicitly carving out the
lender-of-last-resort function. See BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, PRINCIPLES FOR
THE SUPERVISION OF BANKS’ FOREIGN ESTABLISHMENTS 1 (1983) [hereinafter BCBS,
PRINCIPLES].
296. Iceland had obligations arising from its membership in the European Economic
Area, but they did not clearly require it to fund the coverage. See Michael Waibel, Iceland’s
Financial Crisis—Quo Vadis International Law, ASIL Insights (Mar. 1, 2010),
http://www.asil.org/files/insight100301pdf.pdf.
297. Bailouts for international banks are also typically along national lines. See FIN.
SERVS. AUTH., supra note 291, at 97.
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political factors suggest an explanation. First, national regulators currently have
extensive and largely discretionary authority to resolve failed banks, which they
may be reluctant to relinquish under a binding universal resolution scheme. Also,
since the regime would likely be treaty based, it would involve complex
negotiations and direct involvement by the executive and legislature, and regulators
would lack control over the outcome. Second, the interests of large international
banks are somewhat ambiguous, making them unlikely to provide strong support
for such an initiative. On the one hand, they might benefit from efficiency gains if
they could freely allocate their worldwide capital through branching, and greater
certainty for creditors might reduce their cost of funds. On the other hand, without
an explicit international allocation of responsibility for bank failures, large financial
firms may benefit from a market perception that they are more likely to be provided
assistance because of their systemic importance.298 Finally, while a universal
system would likely produce benefits for all, the great powers might benefit
relatively less than others. This is because they are better equipped to make the best
of the unilateral “race for assets”: given the importance of their financial markets
and infrastructure, international banks are more likely to have assets on their
territory. These governments also have more economic and political leverage to
force banks to maintain assets locally by forming separate subsidiaries, pledging
accounts, and observing minimum asset requirements.
C. Why Soft Law and TRNs?
In sum, the current system based on TRNs and soft law is relatively successful
at enforcement cooperation and liberalization. However, it has struggled to secure
cooperation from countries with powerful anti-reform constituencies, as well as to
consistently improve prudential standards. It has also largely ignored areas where
cooperation would require credible commitment mechanisms.299 Given these
limitations, it is conceivable that alternative arrangements—such as treaties, formal
organizations, or dispute resolution—would produce more effective cooperation.
Indeed, such arrangements are the rule in many other areas, including international
trade, the environment, and the law of the sea.300 Why, then, do TRNs and soft law
dominate IFR?

298. See Guttentag & Herring, supra note 295, at 27–28.
299. See infra Table 1.
300. See, e.g., Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr.
15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154, 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994); U.N. Framework Convention on
Climate Change art. 1(2), opened for signature May 9, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107; United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397.
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Table 1: Outcomes of International Financial Regulation
Regulators

Large
Firms
~

Great
Powers
+

Outcome

Enforcement/Supervisory
++
++
Cooperation
Liberalization
~
++
+
+
Improving Regulation in
~
~
+
~
Specific Countries
Adopting Stricter
~ to ++
––
~ to ++
–
Prudential Standards
(varies)
(varies)
Committing to Cross~
~
~
––
Border Resolution
Key: ++ = strongly positive; + = positive; ~ = neutral/indifferent; – = negative; -- =
strongly negative.

The conventional answer draws on rationalist theories of international law,
according to which states choose soft law and informal institutions for reasons of
speed, flexibility, and expertise. As seen above, however, the history of IFR
indicates that soft law and TRNs first emerged in response to the absence of a
formal institutional framework to address new cross-border regulatory challenges
after Bretton Woods collapsed. In turn, this suggests that their persistence may be a
product of historical path dependence. The current IFR system empowers certain
categories of political actors—regulators, large firms, and great powers—which in
turn have an interest in sustaining that system, even though it may be inefficient at
achieving some desirable international regulatory objectives.
In this respect, specialized regulators are inherently conflicted. While they want
regulation to be sufficiently effective to avoid legislative intervention, they also
prefer to act unilaterally whenever possible and, when cooperation is necessary, to
preserve as much discretion and flexibility as possible. From their perspective,
TRNs and soft law are appealing. They provide some degree of cross-border
supervision and enforcement coordination while preserving their discretion to
withhold cooperation in politically sensitive cases. They provide a substantial
degree of liberalization, thus promoting financial development and securing
important support from large firms. They can also produce some coordinated
strengthening of prudential regulation in response to major crises, while preserving
the flexibility to adjust stringency as domestic political winds shift back towards
competitiveness. Therefore, from the regulators’ private perspective, soft law and
TRNs reconcile their wish to achieve short-term regulatory objectives with their
desire to preserve their domestic authority and flexibility.
By contrast, more binding mechanisms would encroach considerably upon that
authority and flexibility. First, national regulators typically lack the legal authority
to commit their state to costly future courses of action, such as deferring to
universal bank resolution proceedings. Therefore, such commitments would often
require a change in law, inviting legislative intervention in their traditional
responsibilities and removing the discretion they currently have in dealing with
such situations. Second, creating institutions or treaties would also involve the
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executive branch in their turf. For instance, U.S. agencies cannot enter into binding
international commitments without approval by the State Department.301 Third,
once adopted, more robust international standards and institutions would take away
some of their authority and discretion. They might no longer be able to navigate
competing domestic political pressures, for instance pressures from industry to
relax regulatory stringency as financial crises recede in time. Stronger monitoring
and enforcement of international standards would also involve international experts
reviewing and second-guessing their actions, creating the potential for
embarrassment (and perhaps sanctions).
In any event, the areas in which TRNs and soft law are unsuccessful are of less
immediate concern to regulators. Specialized regulators in major jurisdictions are
not held responsible for the costs caused by poor regulation in LDCs and OFCs.
While some of these costs are externalized, they are borne by the IFIs,
governments, and taxpayers in the contributing countries, not by financial
regulators. Likewise, the lack of effective monitoring and enforcement of
prudential standards may over time force them to loosen their own regulation, but
they may well prefer this outcome to more rigid standards that would expose them
to political pressure in good economic times. Likewise, the lack of an international
regime for bank resolution is inefficient, but this problem is chronic rather than
acute. When these inefficiencies are pointed out, regulators can argue that only a
treaty could secure better outcomes, while stressing the political and technical
obstacles. In other words, since specialized regulators are not directly accountable
for failures in areas where IFR performs poorly, and they prefer to preserve as
much authority and discretion as possible, they have little incentive to strive for a
more formal and binding IFR system.
Large financial firms, for their part, are likely to be satisfied with the current
system because it is successful at achieving the objectives they favor—such as
liberalization—and unsuccessful at those they disfavor—such as strengthening
prudential regulation. While they might gain from deeper harmonization under a
more robust IFR system, this benefit would likely be outweighed by the costs of
stricter prudential regulation. Likewise, a universal resolution mechanism would
allow them to better allocate their capital, but it would also compromise the
competitive benefits they derive from the implicit safety net.302 Moreover, their
influence is self-reinforcing: as financial liberalization progresses, large firms gain
market share and political influence from smaller, domestically oriented firms that
oppose liberalization. Therefore, they prefer to advocate liberalization initiatives
within the current system, rather than more formal treaties and institutions that
might expose them to stricter regulation.
Finally, since the great powers are in a better position to act unilaterally than
other countries, they benefit relatively less from cooperation. Their markets are
larger and inherently attractive, giving them greater flexibility to adjust their

301. Regulators are also often divided at the national level, for example, insurance
regulators in the United States, but they can join TRNs individually without losing their
autonomy. See David Andrew Singer, Uncertain Leadership: The US Regulatory Response
to the Global Financial Crisis, in GLOBAL FINANCE IN CRISIS 93 (Eric Helleiner, Stefano
Pagliari & Hubert Zimmermann eds., 2010); Brown, supra note 110.
302. See supra note 298 and accompanying text.
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regulation according to domestic needs. Because of the size of their markets and the
prestige of their regulators, their standards are more likely to spread to other
countries through market pressures and ideological diffusion without requiring
formal cooperation. When necessary to control externalities, they can often act
unilaterally or through clubs, rather than resorting to broad-based cooperation. For
instance, the United States pursued a protracted unilateral campaign against Swiss
banks to reduce tax avoidance, and eventually secured substantial cooperation.303
Great powers also have less need for a universal system of bank resolution, because
banks are more likely to have assets in their jurisdiction. Where cooperation is
needed, great powers prefer to avoid formal, independent IOs.304 Rather, they steer
standard-setting to less formal bodies like TRNs and then deputize formal IOs or
clubs to monitor and enforce the standards as needed.305
Thus, all three of the most influential political actors—regulators, firms, and
great powers—have reasons to prefer the current system. This suggests that it may
persist despite its inefficiency. At this point, however, an important clarification is
needed. This Article does not claim that all the unsolved problems of IFR could be
solved with certainty by treaties or formal international organizations. It may be
that some problems are simply intractable. For example, agreeing on an ex ante
burden-sharing formula for banks, or creating rules to designate the home
jurisdiction for insolvency proceedings, would undoubtedly be difficult. The
benefits of facilitating cross-border branching may also be limited given the
availability of alternative channels for capital flows.306 The great powers may do so
well out of territoriality that they would not agree to universality under any
circumstances. In that case, the problem would be a true deadlock that no
institutional solution could solve.307 The claim, then, is not that hard law or
institutions would be desirable in all cases, but that there are strong historical and
political factors that favor soft law and TRNs and hinder the emergence of other
arrangements. As a result, undersupply of welfare-enhancing cooperation in IFR is
more likely than oversupply.
IV. INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL REGULATION AFTER THE CRISIS
A. How Did the Crisis Affect IFR?
The global financial crisis has had two major implications for IFR. First,
prudential regulation, systemic risk, and moral hazard concerns have taken center

303. See, e.g., Bradley J. Bondi, Don’t Tread On Me: Has the United States
Government’s Quest for Customer Records from UBS Sounded the Death Knell for Swiss
Bank Secrecy Laws?, 30 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 1, 7–13 (2010).
304. See Benvenisti & Downs, supra note 197, at 614.
305. See DREZNER, supra note 94, at 71–85.
306. In the domestic context, however, there is evidence suggesting that cross-border
branching retains efficiency advantages over holding company structures. See Prasad
Krishnamurthy, Banking Market Integration and Firm Growth (Sept. 20, 2012) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2149904.
307. On deadlock, see DREZNER, supra note 94; see also Anu Bradford, International
Antitrust Negotiations and the False Hope of the WTO, 48 HARV. INT’L L.J. 383 (2007).
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stage. The failure of several major institutions and the struggle by governments to
manage the consequences drew attention to critical weaknesses in financial
markets. These included high leverage, widespread liquidity vulnerabilities, lack of
transparency of positions, inadequate risk analysis, and interconnected exposures
among market participants.308 The sum of these weaknesses is “systemic risk,” the
risk that the failure of one or more financial institutions can cause a cascading
failure that leads to the collapse of the financial system.309 Financial institutions can
be systemically significant for several reasons: some are so large that their failure
affects many other market participants, others are extensively interconnected with
others through financial contracts, and clusters of institutions with highly correlated
exposures can be systemically significant in aggregate. Because the failure of such
institutions could cause extensive economic damage, governments come under
pressure to rescue them. Since these institutions know this, they have ex ante
incentives to take excessive risks, a phenomenon known as moral hazard. Other
market participants also expect that these institutions will not be allowed to fail and
deal with them on favorable terms, exacerbating their systemic importance.310
As a result, controlling systemic risk and moral hazard has become the central
concern of post-crisis financial reform.311 Numerous approaches have been
proposed: identifying systemically significant financial institutions (SSFIs) and
subjecting them to enhanced prudential regulation and supervision; limiting their
size or activities; establishing a credible resolution procedure for SSFIs; prohibiting

308. See Viral V. Acharya, Thomas Philippon, Matthew Richardson & Nouriel Roubini,
The Financial Crisis of 2007-2009: Causes and Remedies, in RESTORING FINANCIAL
STABILITY: HOW TO REPAIR A FAILED SYSTEM 1, 1–25 (Viral V. Acharya & Matthew
Richardson eds., 2009).
309. Several definitions of systemic risk have been proposed in the economic and legal
literature. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193 (2008). For purposes of
this Article, it is not necessary to take a position on all the controversies involved.
310. There is growing, albeit still tentative, empirical evidence that: (1) CRA ratings of
“too big to fail” (TBTF) banks take favorably into account the likelihood of bailouts, see
Bertrand Rime, Do “Too Big to Fail” Expectations Boost Large Banks Issuer Ratings? (May
9, 2005) (unpublished working paper); Kenichi Ueda & Beatrice Weder di Mauro,
Quantifying Structural Subsidy Values for Systemically Important Financial Institutions
(International Monetary Fund, Working Paper WP/12/128, 2012); (2) TBTF banks have a
lower cost of funding than other banks, controlling for other factors, see Joseph P. Hughes &
Loretta J. Mester, A Quality and Risk-Adjusted Cost Function for Banks: Evidence on the
“Too-Big-To-Fail” Doctrine, 4 J. PRODUCTIVITY ANALYSIS 293 (1993); Viral V. Acharya,
Deniz Anginer & A. Joseph Warburton, The End of Market Discipline? Investor
Expectations of Implicit State Guarantees (March 18, 2013) (unpublished working paper);
(3) banks pay a premium for mergers that make them TBTF, see Elijah Brewer III & Julapa
Jagtiani, How Much Did Banks Pay to Become Too-Big-to-Fail and to Become Systemically
Important? (Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, Working Paper No. 11-37, 2009); and
(4) TBTF banks had a competitive advantage in attracting uninsured deposit during the
crisis, see Raquel de F. Oliveira, Rafael F. Schiozer, & Lucas A. B. de C. Barros, Financial
Crisis and Cross-Border Too Big to Fail Perception, (Sept. 15, 2011) (unpublished working
paper).
311. See, e.g., G20 Seoul Summit 2010, The Seoul Summit Document para. 30,
http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2010/g20seoul-doc.pdf.
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government bailouts to SSFIs; and regulating financial contracts that may create
systemic risk, such as OTC derivatives. Other post-crisis measures aim at
improving prudential regulation more generally, such as raising bank capital
requirements and expanding the regulatory net to the shadow banking system.312
Each of these approaches is complex, and their relative effectiveness is debated.
However, they share one fundamental objective: to force systemic institutions and
market participants to internalize costs that would otherwise be borne by
governments and taxpayers. In other words, they are precisely the type of stricter
prudential regulation that IFR has historically failed to deliver consistently.
Second, the crisis has led to a major effort to update the architecture of IFR and
develop new substantive international standards. The G-20, which had been created
after the Asian financial crisis but played a marginal role, supplanted the G-7 as the
principal forum for international economic cooperation.313 It has taken a more
direct role in setting priorities for regulatory reform and coordinating the work of
TRNs, IFIs, and other actors.314 It reorganized the Financial Stability Forum as the
Financial Stability Board, with a broader mandate and membership, including all
G-20 members.315 The FSB’s mission is to coordinate and oversee the work of
other standard-setting bodies, and in some cases to develop new standards itself in
areas that cut across the mandate of individual TRNs.316 The Basel Committee and
IOSCO’s Technical Committee also expanded their membership.317 The G-20 has
adopted a detailed action plan for reforming IFR, including initiatives on capital
adequacy, cross-border resolution, regulation of rating agencies, hedge funds and
OTC derivatives, global accounting standards, executive compensation, and many
others.318 One feature of many of these initiatives is the decline in reliance on
private standards and self-regulation in favor of mandatory rules.319 The actual
standard-setting work, however, typically remains in the hands of national
regulators and TRNs.320
Thus, the post-crisis reforms do not fundamentally replace TRNs and soft law,
but rather attempt to expand, rationalize, and strengthen the existing system in

312. On shadow banking, see Gerding, supra note 260.
313. See REBECCA M. NELSON, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, THE G-20 AND
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC COOPERATION: BACKGROUND AND IMPLICATIONS FOR CONGRESS
(2010); Mario Giovanoli, The Reform of the International Financial Architecture After the
Global Crisis, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 81 (2009).
314. See NELSON, supra note 313; Giovanoli, supra note 313.
315. See FINANCIAL STABILITY BOARD CHARTER, G-20 (2009).
316. See Giovanoli, supra note 313, at 113–14.
317. See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Expansion of Membership Announced
by the Basel Committee (Mar. 13, 2009), http://www.bis.org/press/p090313.htm; IOSCO,
IOSCO Technical Committee Invites Brazil, China and India to Join Its Membership (Feb. 19,
2009), http://www.iosco.org/news/pdf/IOSCONEWS136.pdf.
318. See PROGRESS REPORT ON THE ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL ACTIONS OF THE LONDON,
WASHINGTON, AND PITTSBURGH G20 SUMMITS (2010).
319. See Eric Helleiner & Stefano Pagliari, Crisis and the Reform of International
Financial Regulation, in GLOBAL FINANCE IN CRISIS: THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL
REGULATORY CHANGE 1, 4, 6–8 (Eric Helleiner, Stefano Pagliari, & Hubert Zimmermann
eds., 2010).
320. See Giovanoli, supra note 313, at 98–117.
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various ways.321 Nevertheless, the assumption by the G-20 of authority over IFR is
an important structural development. The G-20 is not a TRN; it is a political body
made up of the national leaders (or ministers) of the member states. However, it is
not a formal international organization either.322 Like TRNs, the G-20 does not
have international legal personality, its decisions are made by consensus, and they
are not legally binding.323 In theory, it has no formal authority to set goals for IFIs
and TRNs. In practice, however, the G-20 members collectively control a large
majority of votes in the IFIs,324 their financial regulators dominate the principal
TRNs, and they comprise about 85% of the world’s GDP.325 Thus, the G-20 has the
capacity to exercise enormous influence on IFR and potentially overcome the
constraints that have hindered progress in the past. It could play a leadership role,
compelling TRNs to undertake reforms that they would not initiate on their own
because of resistance by national regulators or the financial industry.326 With its
broader membership, it could also balance the influence of the great powers. It
could facilitate trade-offs across issues, overcoming distributive roadblocks that
specialized TRNs cannot handle, and better handle issues that cut across the
functional jurisdiction of individual TRNs, like OTC derivatives and shadow
banking. The new system could also provide more effective monitoring and
enforcement.
The potential effect of this new international architecture may be reinforced by
the strong domestic political demand that has emerged for stronger prudential
regulation after the financial crisis. In major financial centers like the United States,
United Kingdom, and several Continental European countries, costly and wellpublicized bailouts of financial institutions raised fierce political opposition and
demands for reform. The salience of regulatory failures has been raised by multiple
inquiries and reports criticizing the actions of regulators and the financial
industry.327 In some cases, countries did not wait for an international consensus to
emerge before launching major domestic regulatory overhauls. Thus, the DoddFrank Act was adopted in July 2010, and the massive program of rule making it
initiated remains in full swing. The European Union has also already completed
some initiatives, although its reform program has progressed more slowly due to

321. See Mario Giovanoli, The International Financial Architecture and its Reform After
the Global Crisis, in INTERNATIONAL MONETARY AND FINANCIAL LAW: THE GLOBAL CRISIS
3, 36–37 (Mario Giovanoli & Diego Devos eds., 2010); Helleiner, supra note 67, at 632.
322. See Giovanoli, supra note 313, at 103–06.
323. See NELSON, supra note 313, at 8–9.
324. See Giovanoli, supra note 313, at 108.
325. See Landon Thomas Jr. & Julia Werdigier, No Clear Accord on Stimulus by Top
Industrial Nations, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2009, at A1.
326. Indeed, there were some early initiatives along these lines, as the G-20 pushed for
new standards on executive compensation, a global bank tax, and regulation of CRAs and
hedge funds. See Pagliari, supra note 125, at 15, 22, 29–30.
327. See, e.g., FIN. SERVS. AUTH., supra note 291; NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE
CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES, THE FINANCIAL
CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT (2011); THE HIGH-LEVEL GROUP ON FINANCIAL SUPERVISION IN THE
EU, REPORT (2009).

2013]

POLITICAL ECONOMY

1463

greater deference to the international process and competing preoccupations
relating to Europe’s sovereign debt crisis.
B. Post-Crisis Achievements
This section proposes a brief review of three salient items on the post-crisis
agenda: enhanced capital regulation through Basel III, cross-border resolution of
financial institutions, and stronger monitoring and enforcement of international
standards.328 It shows that despite the expectations raised by the combination of
strong political demand for reform and a more streamlined international
architecture, many of the pre-crisis patterns described earlier in this Article persist.
1. Basel III
The G-20 made reforming capital adequacy standards a very high priority.
Numerous banks failed, or would have failed, without official assistance, and many
policymakers and commentators pointed to weaknesses in Basel II.329 The Basel
Committee assumed responsibility over reform and made rapid progress. In
December 2010, it released the principal elements of Basel III.330 The new
framework aims to correct many of the problems of Basel II. It substantially
increases required capital ratios and adopts more stringent and uniform definitions
of regulatory capital. It also introduces several new elements that respond to risks
highlighted by the crisis. Under Basel III, banks will have to maintain, in addition
to the basic capital ratio, a capital conservation buffer to be drawn down in times of
stress.331
Basel III also introduces capital surcharges for “too big to fail” institutions, as
well as a countercyclical buffer under which regulators will have flexibility to
increase capital requirements to control excessive credit growth in favorable
economic conditions.332 These stronger risk-weighted capital requirements will be
supplemented by a simpler and more transparent leverage ratio of 3% capital to
total assets.333 Finally, Basel III will impose new liquidity requirements: the
liquidity coverage ratio, which will require banks to hold enough highly liquid
assets to survive a thirty-day freeze in funding, and the net stable funding ratio,
which will require banks to maintain a minimum amount of stable sources of

328. These are not the only areas in which the post-crisis IFR reform agenda has
encountered significant limitations. For a discussion of the discrepancies between the United
States and European approaches to OTC derivatives reform, see Greene & Boehm, supra
note 2, at 1127–30.
329. See, e.g., Giovanoli, supra note 313, at 87–88.
330. See BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BASEL III: A GLOBAL REGULATORY
FRAMEWORK FOR MORE RESILIENT BANKS AND BANKING SYSTEMS (2010). A revised version
was published in June 2011: BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BASEL III: A GLOBAL
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR MORE RESILIENT BANKS AND BANKING SYSTEMS (2011)
[hereinafter BASEL COMM. (2011)].
331. See BASEL COMM. (2011), supra note 330, at 54–57.
332. See id. at 7, 57–60.
333. See id. at 61–63.
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funding such as long-term debt and deposits.334 These ratios are meant to reduce
banks’ excessive reliance on short-term funding, which led to the downfall of
institutions like Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers when they unexpectedly lost
access to such funding.
On its face, Basel III is a remarkable strengthening of capital requirements. The
Basel Committee estimated that, had the new rules been in place at the end of 2009,
large banks would have had to hold €577 billion of additional capital.335 Since the
adoption of Basel III, banks have begun to rebuild their capital bases, and the gap
between the new requirements and actual capital levels has reportedly fallen by
23% between 2011 and 2012.336 Basel III’s stricter definition of regulatory capital
will also strengthen the resilience of banks by preventing them from counting
various dubious items like deferred tax assets, in favor of more common equity.
Overall, policymakers have openly stated that their objective is to change the
business model of banks towards a more stable, less leveraged, and less profitable
one, attracting fierce industry resistance.337
In other ways, however, Basel III perpetuates pre-crisis patterns. First and most
importantly, it does not replace Basel II’s controversial risk-weighting
methodology, but instead simply increases the percentage of capital to be held
relative to the risk-weighted assets calculated according to Basel II.338 Thus, large
banks will continue to internally generate the parameters used to calculate their
own capital requirements. In recent years, this methodology has become
increasingly controversial. Several analysts have pointed to large discrepancies in
risk estimates produced by different banks based on similar asset portfolios.339
Likewise, senior regulators on both sides of the Atlantic have expressed severe
doubts that the Basel II risk-weighting methodology can produce accurate and
consistent measurements and have called for simpler regulatory solutions like a
high leverage ratio or limits on bank size.340 While it seems unlikely that the Basel

334. See id. at 8–10.
335. See BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, RESULTS OF THE COMPREHENSIVE
QUANTITATIVE IMPACT STUDY (2010).
336. See Brooke Masters, Top Banks Boost Key Capital Ratio Levels, FIN. TIMES
(London), Sept. 20, 2012.
337. See Tom Braithwaite, JPMorgan Seeks Halt to New Capital Rules, FIN. TIMES
(Washington), June 16, 2011; Tom Braithwaite & Francisco Guerrera, Regime Will Reshape
Business Models, FIN. TIMES (New York), Sept. 14, 2010; Yalman Onaran & Simon Clark,
European Banks Poised to Win Reprieve on Capital Rules, BLOOMBERG (July 13, 2010, 7:00
PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-05-16/geithner-meeting-barnier-over-basel-iiicreates-pressure-on-banks-capital.html.
338. See supra notes 105–07 and accompanying text. However, several specific aspects
of Basel II’s calculations that proved inadequate prior to the crisis, like the treatment of
securitization exposures, have been revised.
339. See, e.g., FIN. SERVS. AUTH., RESULTS OF 2009 HYPOTHETICAL PORTFOLIO EXERCISE
FOR SOVEREIGNS, BANKS AND LARGE CORPORATIONS (2009); JAG YOGARAJAH, EXANE BNP
PARIBAS, RISK WEIGHTS ON THE SKINNY SIDE? (2011); Brooke Masters, Capital Rules:
Regulators Seek to Harmonize Banks’ Weighting Models, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 13, 2012.
340. See Brooke Masters, Basel Naysayers Delve into Detail in Battle to Dilute Reforms,
FIN. TIMES (U.S.), Sept. 25, 2012, at 2, (reporting criticism by Thomas Hoenig, a current
FDIC director, and Andrew Haldane, a Bank of England official); Shahien Nasiripour &

2013]

POLITICAL ECONOMY

1465

Committee will abandon its current methodology, the lack of comparability is
raising concerns that banks that apply it more leniently may gain a competitive
advantage.
Second, Basel III might aggravate this comparability problem, because in
addition to retaining considerable discretion for national regulators in approving
and supervising internal risk models, it also introduces new areas of discretion.
Thus, although there are common guidelines for implementing the countercyclical
capital buffer, national authorities ultimately will decide how much additional
capital to require based on their own judgment of the sustainable level of credit in
their economy.341 It is not hard to imagine that in good times, there will be political
pressure to refrain from “taking away the punch bowl” by increasing the buffer.
Likewise, the capital conservation buffer gives national regulators critical
discretion as to how long to allow banks to operate within the buffer range.342
Although the Committee exhorts regulators to apply them transparently and
consistently, the liquidity ratios also admittedly “contain elements of national
discretion to reflect jurisdiction-specific conditions.”343 Some degree of national
discretion may be inevitable for complex international standards, but the fact
remains that both complexity and discretion may further undermine comparability
and make the standards vulnerable to domestic politics.
Third, the Basel III negotiations reflected the usual campaigning by countries to
accommodate the preferences of their banks. France and Germany fought for lower
capital increases and for inclusion of consolidated minority interests in foreign
banks.344 Despite the resistance of European banks, the leverage ratio was retained,
but at 3% it is significantly lower than the 5% requirement for major U.S. banks—
leading to concerns that it will not compensate adequately for the defects of the
risk-weighting methodology. Japanese banks tried to retain their ability to count
Tom Braithwaite, US Regulators Urged to Outdo Basel III Rules, FIN. TIMES (U.S.), Oct. 4,
2012, at 17 (reporting criticism by the Systemic Risk Council, a group led by Sheila Bair, the
former FDIC chairman).
341. See BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS,
GUIDANCE FOR NATIONAL AUTHORITIES OPERATING THE COUNTERCYCLICAL CAPITAL BUFFER
(2010). The guidelines establish an objective “buffer guide,” but stress that the guide “does
not need to play a dominant role in the information used by authorities to take and explain
buffer decisions” and that they “are free to emphasise any other variables and qualitative
information that make sense to them for purposes of assessing the sustainability of credit
growth and the level of system-wide risk . . . .” Id. at 3; see also BASEL COMM. (2011), supra
note 330, at 57–58.
342. See BASEL COMM. (2011), supra note 330, at 56.
343. Id. at 9; BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS,
BASEL III: INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR LIQUIDITY RISK MEASUREMENT, STANDARDS
AND MONITORING 2, 3 (2010).
344. See Donna Borak, Bair Details Inside Story of Regulatory Clash Over Basel III, AM.
BANKER, Sept. 26, 2012; Onaran & Clark, supra note 337. Some policymakers and
commentators, including the heads of the Bank of England and the U.K. FSA, have
suggested that capital ratios should be as high as 15–20%. Brooke Masters & Tom
Braithwaite, Basel III Capital Rules Too Low, Says Turner, FIN. TIMES (London), Mar. 16,
2011, at 10; see also Francesco Guerrera & Daniel Pimlott, Pandit and King Clash over
Basel III, FIN. TIMES, (Oct. 25, 2010, 11:54 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/1d392ba0e071-11df-99a3-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2QuntezGQ.
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deferred tax assets as regulatory capital, although they only gained a temporary
reprieve. More controversial aspects of Basel III, like the systemic risk surcharge
and liquidity requirements, were not finalized when the accord was released in
2010. The details remain to be filled in and many areas are highly controversial.
Finally, since Basel III must be implemented domestically in each jurisdiction,
its adoption is only the beginning of a long and contentious process. It
contemplates a long transition period, with full implementation in 2019. Already,
the implementation process has become highly politicized. In the United States,
regulators face strong opposition by banks. Jamie Dimon, the CEO of JPMorgan
Chase, strongly criticized the systemic risk surcharge and other aspects of Basel III,
calling it “blatantly anti-American.”345 More recently, numerous U.S. banks—large
and small—have raised objections to the proposed rules and requested that
implementation be delayed.346 In November 2012, U.S. banking regulators
announced that the final rules would indeed be delayed indefinitely, missing the
global deadline of January 1, 2013.347 In Europe, implementation of Basel III led to
a political rift between the United Kingdom, which suffered high bailout costs and
wanted faster and stricter implementation, and France and Germany, whose banks
and economies are heavily affected by the ongoing European debt crisis.348 In the
summer of 2012, the United Kingdom acceded to many French and German
demands.349 The Basel Committee has criticized the resulting compromise,
deeming it “noncompliant” with Basel III in two important areas including its
looser capital definitions.350 Its implementation appears likely to be delayed beyond
the international deadlines.351
In sum, Basel III perpetuates a familiar pattern for international prudential
standards: regulators, under intense domestic political pressure, agree to strengthen
existing rules. At the same time, they secure concessions to favor their banks and
rely on complex rules whose effectiveness depends on national supervision. Thus,

345. Tom Braithwaite & Patrick Jenkins, JPMorgan Chief Says Bank Rules ‘Anti-US,’
FIN. TIMES (London), Sept. 12, 2011, at 1; see also Brooke Masters & Tom Braithwaite,
Tighter Rules on Capital: Bankers Versus Basel, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 2, 2011, 10:20 PM),
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/852fe7a4-eb4b-11e0-9a41-00144feab49a.html#axzz2Quntez
GQ.
346. Donna Borak, Big Banks Press for More Time, Revisions on Basel III, AM. BANKER,
Oct. 29, 2012; see also Donna Borak, Majority of Senate Demands Basel III Relief for
Community Banks, AM. BANKER, Sept. 28, 2012.
347. Donna Borak, Community Banks Score Victory as U.S. Delays Basel III, AM.
BANKER, Nov. 13, 2012.
348. For a description of their positions, see Alex Barker & Brooke Masters, EU
Ministers Set for Clash over Banking Rules, FIN. TIMES, May 1, 2012, at 2.
349. See Alex Barker, Deal Reached on EU Bank Reforms, FIN. TIMES (May 15, 2012,
8:41 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/678bc4de-9eb5-11e1-9cc8-00144feabdc0.html#
axzz2QuntezGQ.
350. Brooke Masters & Alex Barker, Inspectors Fault EU Bank Capital Plans, FIN.
TIMES (Oct. 1, 2012, 4:00 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/5a2985c2-0bae011e20b8d800144feabdc0.html#axzz2QuantezGQ.
351. See Jim Brunsden, EU Said to Consider Delay in Basel Rules for Up to a Year,
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 12, 2012, 4:06 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-10-11/eusaid-to-weigh-delaying-basel-bank-rules-for-up-to-a-year.html.
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they retain considerable discretion, including the capacity to relax implementation
in response to political pressure.352 Indeed, soon after the crisis, the industry began
to reassert its influence and demand modifications to the most demanding aspects
of the new rules—as did politicians who worried about the impact of stricter capital
requirements on economic recovery. In turn, such modifications may increase
competitive pressures on other regulators to relax their own implementation. Basel
III also illustrates the role of path dependence for specific international standards:
despite widespread criticism and well-recognized problems, the Basel II riskweighting approach is deeply entrenched, and most regulators appear to see no
feasible alternative but to build upon it.
2. Cross-Border Bank Resolution
At the London Summit, the G-20 directed the FSB, IMF, World Bank, and the
Basel Committee to develop an international framework for cross-border bank
resolution.353 So far, the results fall well short of this objective. Even before the
crisis, experts believed that only a treaty could truly secure cooperation in this
area.354 In a recent report, the Basel Committee echoes this view, stating that an
enforceable agreement on burden-sharing “would be an essential element, along
with other important changes in national legal frameworks, for the creation of a
comprehensive framework for the resolution of cross-border financial groups.”355
Concluding that such an agreement is unfeasible in current circumstances, the
BCBS and the IMF have effectively abandoned the initial goal of developing a
comprehensive framework. Instead, they have adopted a less ambitious “middle
ground” approach that recognizes that states will act unilaterally in a crisis, and
tries to make such improvements as can be achieved without binding
commitments.356
In practice, this means encouraging states to improve aspects of their domestic
resolution procedures that may hinder cross-border resolution even where they
wish to cooperate, for instance, by removing legal restrictions on voluntary
cooperation, improving advanced planning for resolution of complex institutions,
and facilitating continuity of services and contractual relationships. These standards
would require assistance “only to the extent that the authorities determine that such

352. See Singer, supra note 301, at 104–05.
353. G20, DECLARATION ON STRENGTHENING THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM—LONDON SUMMIT
2 (2009); see also PROGRESS REPORT ON THE ACTIONS OF THE LONDON AND WASHINGTON
G20 SUMMITS 11 (2009).
354. See, e.g., CROSS-BORDER BANK INSOLVENCY, supra note 282, at 184.
355. BCBS REPORT, supra note 285, at 4. The IMF has expressed similar views; see
INT’L MONETARY FUND, RESOLUTION OF CROSS-BORDER BANKS—A PROPOSED FRAMEWORK
FOR ENHANCED COORDINATION (2010).
356. BCBS REPORT, supra note 285, at 19. Later G20 documents reflect this more limited
objective. See, e.g., G20, LEADERS’ STATEMENT, THE PITTSBURGH SUMMIT 9 (2010); G20,
THE G20 SEOUL SUMMIT LEADERS’ DECLARATION 8 (2010); G20, THE G20 TORONTO SUMMIT
DECLARATION 17–18 (2010). For a defense of this approach, see Hüpkes & Devos, supra
note 288.
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co-ordination is consistent with their own national interests.”357 The Basel
Committee candidly concluded in July 2011 that “[t]here has been no progress
towards the development of a framework for cross-border enforcement of
resolution actions[.]”358 Even within the new, more limited objectives, results so far
are modest.359 More ambitious projects, such as ex ante burden-sharing agreements
for specific institutions, remain on the table but their prospects are unclear.360
Once again, familiar patterns persist. The IFR system struggles to address the
commitment problem involved in developing arrangements for resolution and
burden sharing for cross-border financial firms. Interestingly, some of the largest
financial firms appear to have concluded that the benefits of a stronger resolution
regime would outweigh its costs. Thus, several large banks and industry groups
have called for binding international rules on cross-border resolution.361 Despite
this, while the need for greater cooperation is widely accepted, progress appears
stalled by the lack of interest on the part of national regulators and great powers in
relinquishing their discretion to address failures on an ad hoc basis.
3. Monitoring and Enforcement
The G-20 has also initiated efforts to strengthen monitoring and enforcement of
international standards. As seen above, the FSAP program historically targeted
developing countries, but the gravest pre-crisis regulatory failures occurred in
advanced economies. At the Washington Summit, all G-20 members committed to
undertake FSAP reviews. Since then, the IMF has launched a process to identify all
systemically important national financial systems and conduct mandatory FSAPs
every five years, and FSB members have committed themselves to “peer reviews”
of their adherence to FSAP recommendations.362 These country peer reviews will
focus on implementation and effectiveness of regulatory, supervisory, and other
financial sector policies; the reports will be published; and the FSB will follow up
on recommendations.363 The FSB will also conduct thematic peer reviews of the
implementation of specific standards across countries, although individual TRNs

357. INT’L MONETARY FUND, supra note 355, at 18.
358. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS,
RESOLUTION POLICIES AND FRAMEWORKS—PROGRESS SO FAR 5 (2011).
359. See id. at 31–39; FIN. STABILITY BD., PROGRESS IN IMPLEMENTING THE G20
RECOMMENDATIONS ON FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM 4 (2012).
360. In July 2011, the FSB released a consultative document that appears to set more
ambitious goals for the cross-border resolution regime. See FIN. STABILITY BD., EFFECTIVE
RESOLUTION OF SYSTEMICALLY IMPORTANT FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 29–30, 45, 69–70
(2011). At this point, the prospects of these proposals are unclear. They are also carefully
hedged to preserve the host state’s discretion to prefer local creditors. See id. at 29, cls. 8.4,
8.6.
361. See Greene & Boehm, supra note 2, at 1130.
362. See INT’L MONETARY FUND, INTEGRATING STABILITY ASSESSMENTS UNDER THE
FINANCIAL SECTOR ASSESSMENT PROGRAM INTO ARTICLE IV SURVEILLANCE (2010).
363. See FIN. STABILITY BD., FSB FRAMEWORK FOR STRENGTHENING ADHERENCE TO
INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS 2 (2010) [hereinafter FSB FRAMEWORK (2010)]; FIN. STABILITY
BD., HANDBOOK FOR FSB PEER REVIEWS (2011) [hereinafter FSB HANDBOOK].
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like the Basel Committee and IOSCO will have primary responsibility for peer
review of standards they designed.364
This new process is still in its infancy, and how much it will achieve remains
unclear. On the one hand, it promises more frequent evaluations by peers with
direct regulatory expertise, which may alleviate the shortcomings of existing IFI
oversight. It also puts pressure on existing TRNs to improve their monitoring, since
the FSB expects them to have “robust peer review mechanism[s] in place that [are]
comparable to th[ose] of the FSB.”365 On the other hand, the peer review system
has substantial limitations. The country reviews’ principal goal is to assess progress
in addressing recommendations in FSAP and ROSC reports, not to independently
evaluate the country’s compliance with international standards.366 A country that is
found “compliant” or “largely compliant” by the IMF will not require further
evaluation. In securities regulation, signature of the IOSCO MMOU will be
considered sufficient.367 Based on the FSB’s Handbook, both country and thematic
peer reviews will rely primarily on questionnaires filled out by the country’s own
regulators, and are not expected to include on-site visits.368 Given this procedure, it
seems likely that—like prior efforts—peer reviews will be more effective at
assessing formal than substantive compliance. Their effectiveness will depend
crucially on the willingness of regulators to forcefully question and challenge their
peers. As seen above, however, regulators have historically been reluctant to breach
a deep-seated norm of mutual deference.
The G-20 and the FSB have also announced a new “toolbox of measures” to
encourage adherence to international standards by nonmembers.369 Under this
process, the FSB will identify problem jurisdictions based on their financial
importance and compliance assessments. These jurisdictions, whose identities will
not be disclosed, “will be invited to engage in a confidential dialogue with the FSB
in order to further evaluate their adherence and identify ways to improve
adherence.”370 Ultimately, if the FSB identifies uncorrected weaknesses, it may
recommend coercive measures such as placing the jurisdiction on a list of
noncooperative countries and imposing greater due diligence obligations or outright

364. See FSB HANDBOOK, supra note 363, at 1–2, 4–5.
365. See id. at 4.
366. Press Release, Fin. Stability Board, FSB Completes Peer Review of Spain 2 (Feb. 7,
2011); FSB HANDBOOK, supra note 363, at 2.
367. FSB FRAMEWORK (2010), supra note 363, at 3. In October 2011, the FSB
announced a new framework to better coordinate its role and that of the TRNs in assessing
the implementation of reforms. FIN. STABILITY BD., A COORDINATION FRAMEWORK FOR
MONITORING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF AGREED G20/FSB FINANCIAL REFORMS (2011).
368. See FSB HANDBOOK, supra note 364, at 6–9. The team may also collect information
from other sources, such as TRNs and “market sources, other stakeholders and academia.”
Id. at 8.
369. FSB FRAMEWORK (2010), supra note 363, at 1; G20, DECLARATION ON
STRENGTHENING THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM—LONDON SUMMIT 2 (2009).
370. FIN. STABILITY BD., PROMOTING GLOBAL ADHERENCE TO INTERNATIONAL
COOPERATION AND INFORMATION EXCHANGE STANDARDS 2 (2010). The expert team leading
the dialogue, however, “would not itself conduct an assessment or re-assessment of
compliance.” Id. at 8.
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restrictions on cross-border transactions.371 While this initiative appears innovative,
in many respects it repeats prior efforts to target OFCs with sanctions to secure
greater cooperation with onshore tax authorities.372 Thus, it focuses on cooperation
and information exchange rather than on substantive regulation, and prioritizes
formal compliance by relying on IFI assessments and formal signature of the
MMOU.373 The array of potential sanctions is impressive—in theory, they could
reach so far as to effectively exclude the offending country from the international
financial system. It is unclear, however, how the FSB proposes to solve the
collective action problems endemic in international sanctions374 or the tensions
between this coercive program and the consensus-based TRN process.375 The
“toolbox of measures” is not intended to give teeth to international financial
standards generally; it is merely a new installment in the campaign against OFCs.
In sum, the introduction of mandatory FSAP and peer reviews, while positive,
will be relatively infrequent and appear to focus on formal rather than substantive
compliance. These mechanisms also rely on the ability and willingness of national
regulators to evaluate and criticize their colleagues’ compliance efforts, which they
historically have been reluctant to do. The most aggressive new compliance
initiative is aimed at OFCs, whose role was not central to the crisis, rather than at
the developed jurisdictions where the most salient regulatory failures originated.
Thus, despite these efforts, the IFR system may continue to encounter serious
difficulties in ensuring effective and consistent implementation of standards.
C. Where to from Here?
In light of these limitations, the achievements of post-crisis IFR should not be
exaggerated.376 In many ways, they repeat familiar patterns: prudential standards
are enhanced in response to political pressure while preserving the authority and
discretion of national regulators; some issues, like bank resolution, remain largely
off limits; the financial industry can effectively oppose costly prudential standards
both at the formation and implementation stages; and monitoring and enforcement
of standards remains weak, in part because of the deep-seated reluctance of
regulators to be seen as interfering in each others’ jurisdiction. In some cases,
domestic reform initiatives driven by intense political pressure have simply
outpaced international efforts. Thus, legislatures have taken a central role, eclipsing
to some extent the traditional primacy of specialized regulators and forcing the G20 and TRNs to play catch up. For example, after the Dodd-Frank Act, a clearing

371. See id. at 20–21.
372. See Giovanoli, supra note 313, at 121.
373. See FIN. STABILITY BD., supra note 370, at 4–5.
374. See Daniel W. Drezner, Bargaining, Enforcement, and Multilateral Sanctions: When
is Cooperation Counterproductive?, 54 INT’L ORG. 73 (2000).
375. At least one TRN declined to take part in sanctions decisions. See FIN. STABILITY
BD., PROMOTING GLOBAL ADHERENCE TO REGULATORY AND SUPERVISORY STANDARDS ON
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND INFORMATION EXCHANGE: PROGRESS REPORT 3, n. 6
(2011).
376. See Fioretos, supra note 136, at 390–91; Singer, supra note 301, at 105.
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requirement for OTC derivatives was hastily added to the G-20/FSB program.377
The United States has moved ahead with the Volcker Rule, which has not been
adopted by other countries. U.S. and European approaches differ in several areas,
including hedge fund regulation, CRAs, and derivatives.378 Some initiatives, like
the global bank tax, simply fizzled out because of disagreement in the G-20.
In response to the shortcomings of IFR, prominent commentators have proposed
the creation of a formal international organization, backed by binding legal
obligations, to regulate international finance.379 The conventional answer is that
such proposals are politically infeasible because states are unwilling to delegate
financial regulation to an international organization due to sovereignty concerns.380
On its own, this explanation seems insufficient. After all, states have created
binding international treaties and institutions in several areas with profound
domestic policy implications, including climate change, nuclear energy, and trade.
This article suggests instead that radical reform of IFR is highly unlikely because
historical path dependence and political economy create a high degree of inertia in
the current system.381 Nevertheless, the mounting challenges of financial
interdependence and the recurrence of serious regulatory failures will likely
continue to increase demand for stronger international rules and oversight. For the
foreseeable future, then, IFR may exist in an uneasy state of tension between
pressures for reform and political and historical constraints on its evolution. Over
time, the trend is likely to be towards more binding agreements and stronger
monitoring, at least in areas—such as prudential regulation and cross-border
resolution—where the limitations of TRNs and soft law are most evident. This
progress in international cooperation, however, is likely to be gradual, slow, and
punctuated by crises.
In the near term, the analysis above suggests useful directions for reforms. First,
the issue of substantive compliance with international standards must become much
more central. One option is to further enhance the monitoring and enforcement
capabilities of IFIs and TRNs, for instance, by letting international or peer country
officials directly inspect large financial firms and conduct detailed independent
audits of national supervision. A second, largely neglected option would be to
consciously design international standards so as to facilitate effective monitoring
and enforcement within the institutional constraints of IFR. From that standpoint,
the best domestic rules may not make the best international standards.382 Thus,
from a domestic perspective, Basel II’s turn towards sophisticated internal risk
models may be a logical evolution of the Basel I risk-weighting framework.
However, Basel II’s complexity and reliance on national supervisory skill
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undermine the goal of international uniformity.383 A less sophisticated but more
transparent approach would greatly facilitate monitoring and enforcement.
Second, compliance with IFR will continue to depend on decentralized
monitoring and pressures by IFIs, peer regulators, and market participants for the
foreseeable future, despite the limitations of these mechanisms. To maximize their
effectiveness, policymakers should design standards that are simple and transparent
enough that such actors can assess substantive compliance—even if this comes at
some cost in technical optimality of the rules.384 Concretely, this might involve
greater use of regulatory approaches that reduce complexity and national discretion.
For instance, the Basel Committee should consider simplifying the buffet of
alternative and optional rules in the Basel II risk-weighting framework.385 Also, the
role of market participants in monitoring financial firms could be enhanced by
requiring banks to issue contingent convertible debt386 and by making bank
disclosure more detailed and usable.387 In general, international standards may
perform better if they incorporate structural solutions—such as limiting the size of
banks or prohibiting specific activities—instead of regimes like Basel II that rely
on national regulators to oversee complex risk management systems.388 Compliance
with such solutions would be easier for IFIs, peer regulators and markets to assess.
Third, policymakers should explore the possibility of complementing soft law
with binding obligations in areas where enforcement and commitment problems are
most pronounced. For instance, experts have long argued that a treaty would be the
only way to create a functioning system of cross-border bank resolution. While
regulators recognize this, they assert that the political will does not exist.389 It may
be worth creating a template that would be available when the next cycle of crisis
and reform happens. The solution might be a treaty that lays out an umbrella of
legal obligations for states, such as to comply with ex ante agreements on
resolution and loss sharing, under which regulators could negotiate detailed
arrangements for specific firms. These arrangements could be adapted in response
to changing circumstances, thus combining the “compliance pull” of formal
obligations with the flexibility of current cooperation arrangements.
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CONCLUSION
This Article has argued that the current IFR system, based on TRNs and soft
law, is only partly successful at achieving desirable international cooperation. It has
generally failed to secure improvements in regulation in countries with powerful
antireform constituencies, to produce consistent improvements in prudential
standards, and to address areas like bank resolution where cooperation requires
credible commitment mechanisms. It has also argued that this state of affairs is not
a product of rational design by states, but the outcome of historical path
dependence and the interests of the most powerful political actors in IFR:
regulators, financial firms, and great powers. While some reforms have occurred,
these patterns persist. As a result, there is reason to doubt that IFR can effectively
address the most salient postcrisis challenges—moral hazard and systemic risk—at
least in the short-term. Instead, increasing demand for international cooperation
may lead to gradual strengthening of the IFR system, including a partial move
away from exclusive reliance on TRNs and soft law.
This argument has implications for broader debates about rational choice
approaches to international law and financial globalization. In recent years,
rationalist theories have made great strides in explaining how states can use
international law and institutions to solve cooperation problems and achieve joint
gains. However, such theories can also predispose scholars of specific areas such as
IFR to assume they are optimally designed, overemphasize evidence to that effect,
and neglect important problems of compliance and effectiveness. While rational
choice theory is a major advance in international law scholarship, it is inherently
probabilistic: other things being equal, states are likely to design institutions
rationally. However, other things are rarely equal: international institutions may be
inefficient for many reasons, including historical path dependence, principal-agent
problems, interest group politics, and power inequalities. Thus, when analyzing
specific institutions, scholars should carefully assess their effectiveness and the
historical and political processes that shaped them. While this makes the analysis
more challenging, it will allow more meaningful critique.
The framework proposed here also reveals how much research remains to be
done on IFR. In particular, systematic empirical research remains in its infancy, and
opportunities abound for fruitful inquiry. How are standards negotiated? Through
what channels does the political influence of various actors manifest itself? To
what extent do the resulting standards require departure from existing national
practices? Once standards are adopted, which countries adopt them, and why?
What difficulties arise in implementation? How does the formal process of
adopting uniform standards interact with the informal process of transnational
policy diffusion? Does the adoption of a standard actually change practices on the
ground? If so, under what conditions is compliance more or less likely? Even when
they are complied with, are the standards effective at attaining their policy
objectives? These questions can only be answered by research on the development,
implementation, and effect of specific IFR initiatives.
Finally, proponents of liberal international finance should not celebrate the
current weakness of IFR. If the current system cannot effectively control the
externalities of financial crises, create and sustain strong prudential standards, or
handle the failure of large financial firms, the result may be an increasing burden
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on governments and taxpayers. Ultimately, weak IFR may not necessarily lead to
freer markets in the long run. The instability of the Great Depression ushered in the
Bretton Woods system that strictly limited international finance. Not
coincidentally, after the recent crisis, the IMF has warmed to capital controls.390
Some commentators now advocate robust “host country” regulation, requiring
banks to establish ring-fenced subsidiaries in each country.391 Over time, the
alternative to effective cooperation may not be freer global markets, but increasing
de jure or de facto restraints on capital mobility.
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